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Carlo PELLOSO
‘Popular Prosecution’ in Early Athenian Law:
the Drakonian Roots of the Solonian Reform
Drakonian procedures and offences against the community
Among many legal historians it’s a very common belief, mainly grounded 
on a famous passage of the (Aristotelian) Constitution of the Athenians1, that 
the so called ‘public actions’, as opposed to those δίκαι that just the party 
concretely harmed is entitled to bring, date back to the Solonian reforms, 
that is back to the beginning of the sixth century B.C.2 
1. Ath. Pol. 9.1: τρία ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὰ δημοτικώτατα: ... ἔπειτα τὸ ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομέ-
νῳ τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων. This source is always read together with Plut. Sol. 
18.5: ἔτι μέντοι μᾶλλον οἰόμενος δεῖν ἐπαρκεῖν τῇ τῶν πολλῶν ἀσθενείᾳ, παντὶ λαβεῖν 
δίκην ὑπὲρ τοῦ κακῶς πεπονθότος ἔδωκε. καὶ γὰρ πληγέντος ἑτέρου καὶ βιασθέντος 
ἢ βλαβέντος ἐξῆν τῷ δυναμένῳ καὶ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι τὸν ἀδικοῦντα καὶ διώκειν, 
ὀρθῶς ἐθίζοντος τοῦ νομοθέτου τοὺς πολίτας ὥσπερ ἑνὸς μέρη σώματος συναισθάνεσθαι 
καὶ συναλγεῖν ἀλλήλοις. On these passages and on the beginnings of ‘Athenian voluntary 
prosecution’, see: Glotz (1904: 371 f.); Bonner and Smith (1938: 151 ff.); Ruschenbusch 
(1968: 48 ff.); Harrison (1971: 76 f.); MacDowell (1978: 53 f.); Rhodes (1981: 160); Os-
borne (1985); Fisher (1990: 123 f.); Todd (1993: 91 f., 100); Hunter (1994: 125 f.); Sealey 
(1994: 129 ff.); Christ (1998: 26 ff., 120 ff.); Rubinstein (2003); Ober (2005: 402); Gagarin 
(2006: 263); Rhodes (2006: 255). Rhodes has shown that behind Plutarch and Aristotle a 
common source lies; that this source had access to Solon’s poems, given that both accounts 
partly are overlapping and partly are different; and that, since Aristotle quotes laws which 
are no longer in force and Plutarch quotes laws from numbered axones, it also had a direct 
access to Solonian laws: Rhodes (1981: 88, 118); see, moreover, MacDowell (1978: 31).
2. See, for instance, Todd (1993: 100); Sealey (1994: 127 ff.); Allen (2000: 39); Gagarin 
(2006: 263); Lanni (2006: 35); Wohl (2010: 117).
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Apart from the problem concerning the real legal significance of the 
above-mentioned ‘procedural categories’3, such a belief is to some extent 
not incorrect. Yet, it certainly needs a deeper analysis and a more devel-
oped and detailed overall reconstruction. Thus, with a view of this main 
object, this article will deal with some pre-Solonian institutions that may 
be considered the actual historical roots – if not the direct and immediate 
antecedents – of the early and classical adversarial legal system. A system 
that, as it is well known, in Athens was persistently focused on two strong-
ly democratic principles: ‘voluntary prosecution’ and ‘popular sovereignty 
in judicial jurisdiction’.
Many sources support the idea that – at least in the view shared by 
some fourth century Athenian writers – in the archaic πόλις, i.e. even before 
Drako, the Areopagus was not only an aristocratic Council vested with de-
liberative, executive and administrative powers, as the noun βουλὴ itself sug-
gests, together with the Aristotelian4 statement ‘διῴκει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ 
μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει’ (‘it administered the most numerous and the most 
relevant of the πόλις’ affairs’). Indeed, as a fundamental pillar of the ‘oligar-
chic’ constitution in force at least from Kylon to Solon5, the early aristocrat-
3. The main differences between civil and public procedures turn on the objective, on the 
interests protected and, accordingly, on the methods of prosecution. Nowadays, a civil action 
seeks to pursue redress by restitution or compensation, since the wrongdoer, once convicted, 
is not punished but only suffers so much harm as it is necessary to make the successful claim-
ant to get a benefit or to avoid a loss; in contrast, the main goal pursued by criminal justice 
is to inflict a punishment intended to deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation. 
Civil cases, being disputes between individuals concerning legal duties and responsibilities 
they owe one another, are started by the individual who has suffered a harm for his own 
benefit only, so that bringing a civil action is never mandatory, but always dependent on the 
personal choice of the individual injured; criminal cases, on the contrary, are considered of-
fences against the state or against the society as a whole and, accordingly, they are started in 
the name and on behalf of the state in order to punish the accused, rather than to restore the 
single individual involved (Geldart [1984: 146]; Hall [2012: 17 f., 25 ff.]). On this background, 
it is noteworthy that some legal systems apply rules providing an unfettered ‘prosecutorial 
discretion’ (this means that prosecutors enjoy full discretion whether to file a charge against 
a suspect, or not: Damaska [1981]), others involve ‘mandatory prosecution’ (that is the law 
imposes the duty to prosecute if the conviction, given the evidence, seems to be possible: Lu-
paria [2002]); in others again, there is a criminal justice principle to the effect that any citizen 
has the right to bring criminal charges when a public interest is harmed (art. 125 Spanish 
Const.). Athenian legal system hardly seems to match such a modern antithesis: the Atheni-
ans created a very adversarial system based on voluntary prosecution, and characterized by 
the absence of a ‘governmental public prosecutor’ and of a ‘mandatory prosecution’.
4. Cf., on the problem concerning the authorship of Ath. Pol., Rhodes (1981: 58 ff.).
5. Ath. Pol. 2.2, 4.1-2, 7.1, 8.2, 41.2; Arist. Pol. 1274b 15-18; von Fritz (1954: 77 ff.); 
Rhodes (1981: 84 ff.); Valdés Guía (2012: 322 f.).
‘popular prosecution’ in early athenian law 11
ic βουλὴ was empowered to exercise ‘judicial’ and ‘supervisory’ functions 
(rather than ‘censorial’ ones, comparable to the Roman cura morum)6. Aristo-
tle, together with Plutarch7, attests that the Areopagites were vested with the 
6. Cf. Ostwald (1993: 143 f.); see, contra, Cawkwell (1988: 9 f.), who, on the grounds 
of Ath. Pol. 3.6, 8.4, Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F196), and Isokrates (above all Isok. 
1.46), argues that «the Areopagus would seem to have had a sort of moral supervision 
of the state, a cura morum in Roman terms» (a similar opinion was earlier proposed by 
Bonner and Smith [1938: 97]; see, for a more recent account, O’Sullivan [2009: 78 ff.]). 
More exactly, I suppose that the nomophylactic function tended to control and to punish 
some offences (provided in laws, whether written or not) which even embraced immoral 
behaviors and disorderly conducts: yet, it hardly seems for men to be liable for anything 
other than for breaches of νόμοι. As regards this particular topic, we do have information 
on one matter: indeed, we know that Solon, by reforming a previous and more severe law 
enacted by Drako, gave the Areopagus jurisdiction over ἀργία (idleness) and introduced 
a γραφή (or, better, an action susceptible to be taken by anyone): cf. Diog. Laert. 1.55; 
Lex. Cantabr. 665.19-20; Anekd. Bekk. 310.3; Poll. 8.42; Plut. Sol. 17.2, 22.3; Ath. Pol. 
8.5; Dem. 57.32; Isok. 1.44; see Lipsius [1905-15: 353 f.]; Bonner and Smith [1938: 133]; 
Wallace [1989: 62 ff.]; Sealey [1994: 128 f.]; de Bruyn [1995: 79 ff.]). In my opinion, this 
ancient law (already in its Drakonian formulation) was mainly aimed at preserving the 
family estate from ἀπορία (Isok. 1.44), i.e. from ‘dissipation of substances’, and the Solo-
nian remedy was directed to provide protection in the particular interest of victims that the 
legislator himself clearly perceived as legally and/or physically prevented from initiating 
procedures autonomously, i.e., as for this case, the future heirs of the ἀργός. Differently, 
the goal pursued by this archaic νόμος, in Wallace’s opinion, «was … to protect against 
theft» (Wallace [1989: 63]), while, according to de Bruyn, «était de protéger la société 
contre les dangers de l’oisiveté et de la prodigalité, dont la conséquence inévitable était la 
pauvreté, qui elle-même conduisait au crime» (de Bruyn [1995: 80]). Both these ideas fail 
to consider the wrong at issue, that is ἀργία, as an offence against the family (qualifying it, 
on the contrary, as a ‘societal crime’, even if the sources do not prove such an inference), 
as well as they fail to focus on the legal problem consequently implied (overlooking that 
the immediate victims of this offence did not have any ‘standing to sue’).
7. See Ath. Pol. 3.6 (ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴ τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἶχε τοῦ διατηρεῖν 
τοὺς νόμους, διῴκει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ 
ζημιοῦσα πάντας τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κυρίως. ἡ γὰρ αἵρεσις τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀριστίνδην καὶ 
πλουτίνδην ἦν, ἐξ ὧν οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται καθίσταντο. διὸ καὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρχῶν αὕτη μεμένηκε 
διὰ βίου καὶ νῦν), and 8.4 (τὴν δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὸ νομοφυλακεῖν, ὥσπερ 
ὑπῆρχεν καὶ πρότερον ἐπίσκοπος οὖσα τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τά τε ἄλλα τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ 
τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πολιτ<ικ>ῶν διετήρει, καὶ τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας ηὔθυνεν κυρία οὖσα καὶ 
ζημιοῦν καὶ κολάζειν). On the link existing between the Solonian and the pre-Solonian 
Areopagus, cf. de Bruyn (1995: 20, nt. 11): «nous pensons … que l’idée prônée par Aris-
tote d’une continuité entre l’Aréopage antésolonien et solonien, même si elle ne s’appuie 
sur aucun document, est raisonnable dans la mesure où elle s’inscrit dans la vision d’un 
développement continu des institutions athénienne depuis l’origine de la πόλις» (contra, 
cf. Wallace [1989: 39 ff.], who maintains that the account of the pre-solonian Areopagite 
regime is retrojected from what Aristotle knew or believed about the Solonian Areopa-
gus). For the Areopagus was composed by archons chosen ‘by distinction and by wealth’ 
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τάξις (the institutional task) of διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους (watching over the 
νόμοι), and their Council acted in the quality of ἐπίσκοπος of the πολιτεία 
(supervisor of the constitution) before and under Solon’s archonship, as 
well as of φύλαξ τῶν νόμων (guardian of the ‘nomic system’) according to 
the terminology used in the (spurious) Drakonian constitution8. What is 
more, the pre-Drakonian Areopagites, administrating the πόλις with regard 
(Ath. Pol. 3.6; cf. Plut. Sol. 19.1), and for this Council was considered the oldest and most 
venerable political board in Athens, it’s reasonable to believe that, even before Solon, the 
Areopagus had wide, if not even undefined, powers which are elsewhere described in 
terms of ‘guardianship of the laws’ (cf., as for the Solonian Areopagus, Ath. Pol. 8.4; Plut. 
Sol. 19.2; with regard to the so-called Drakonian constitution, cf. Ath. Pol. 4.4; finally, as 
for the period after the Persian wars, cf. Ath. Pol. 25.2), and which very likely included 
‘jurisdiction over crimes against the πόλις’ (cf. Rhodes [1979: 104 f.]; Ostwald [1985: 7 
f.]). Accordingly, nothing in Ath. Pol. 3.6 seems to allow, as for the πρώτη πολιτεία, a 
distinction between a ‘constitutional function of overseeing and protecting the laws’ and 
‘a de facto governmental power’ (cf., contra, Wallace [1989: 40]). For debate on the original 
Areopagite powers and their restriction, see: Bonner and Smith (1938: 88 ff., 145, 163, 255 
ff., 326 ff., 362); Harrison (1971: 36 ff.); MacDowell (1978: 114 ff.); Gagarin (1981a: 60, 
111 ff.); Ostwald (1985: 7 ff., 28 ff., 41 f., 66 f., 70 ff.); Thür (1991). Cf., on the contrary, 
Wallace (1989: 3 ff.), supporting the view that, before Solon, the Areopagus just heard 
homicide cases (yet, «on voit difficilement pourquoi Solon aurait subitement transformé 
un simple tribunal pour cause d’homicide en un Conseil aux attribution étendues»: de 
Bruyn [1995: 20, nt. 11]); moreover, the scholar assumes that Ath. Pol. 3.6 is «based on a 
priori conceptions of the nature of Solon’s reforms, and virtually isolated in its claim that 
before Solon the Areopagos had broad judicial or managerial powers». These statements 
cannot be shared: the Kylonian affair and the Solonian amnesty law, as well as Plutarch 
and Isokrates, prove the opposite; the extraordinary importance attached to the Prytaneion 
(qualified as an aristocratic body vested with political powers and advisory roles) rests 
ultimately on some personal (and open to criticisms) inferences from the Solonian amnesty 
law (cf., infra, ntt. 12, 17).
8. Ath Pol. 4.4: ἡ δὲ βουλὴ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου φύλαξ ἦν τῶν νόμων καὶ διετήρει τὰς 
ἀρχάς, ὅπως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἄρχωσιν. de Bruyn (1995: 86, nt. 360), following Bonner 
and Smith (1938: 262), and Wade-Gery (1958: 131 f.), believes that ‘ἐπίσκοπος of the 
constitution’ and ‘φύλαξ of the laws’ are not interchangeable phrases, since the former 
would concern jurisdiction over crimes against the city, while the latter would be only 
related to the control over the magistrates (cf. Daverio Rocchi [2001: 334 f.]; Berti [2012: 
73]). Yet, out of Ath. Pol. 8.4 (τὴν δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὸ νομοφυλακεῖν, 
ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχεν καὶ πρότερον ἐπίσκοπος οὖσα τῆς πολιτείας), one can argue against her 
assumption (see Cawkwell [1988]; Wallace [1989: 42]; Poddighe [2014: 331 ff.], with fur-
ther bibliography). We could accordingly suppose that, in its strictest sense, the Areopagite 
νομοφυλακία consisted in protecting and watching over (διατηρεῖν) all those rules and 
principles (νόμοι) that granted public order, peace, and constitutional stability (πολιτεία), 
as well as in judging, fining, and punishing those who violated such rules and principles 
(ἀκοσμούντες; on the equation ‘ἀκοσμούντες = offenders of the established order’, see 
Dem. 24.9; cf. Isok. 7.37, 39, 46); cf. Banfi (2012: 52), who uses the phrase «controllo di 
legalità». Further, see, infra, nt. 10.
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to the most copious and the most important issues, passed final judgments 
and decisions (κυρίως), inflicting both bodily punishments and monetary 
fines9 to all the ἀκοσμούντες tried before them (i.e. all those Athenians who 
infringed the ‘established order’, whether they were magistrates or not)10. 
9. The two participles κολαζοῦσα and ζημιοῦσα (Ath. Pol. 3.6), that – in my opinion 
– explain both ‘διῴκει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει’ and ‘τὴν μὲν τάξιν 
εἶχε τοῦ διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους’, corroborate the idea that the Areopagus originally had 
an undifferentiated, indistinct and extremely broad power that merged several functions. 
In other words, the Areopagus’ political management was not confined to a particular 
and specified sphere of competence, as well as ‘punishing’ and ‘inflicting fines’ were not 
limited to the judicial sphere. ‘Punishing’ and ‘inflicting fines’ (on the grounds of polit-
ical and judicial powers) are mentioned as mere examples, although Aristotle evidently 
conceived of the Areopagite activity of combating offences against the established order as 
the most important form of ‘administration’ of the archaic city: cf. Rhodes (1981: 108); 
Wallace (1989: 40); Ostwald (1993: 144). Ath. Pol. 23.1 and 25.1-2 give support to this 
interpretation: in these passages, indeed, the Areopagite hegemony, obtained after the Per-
sian wars not by decree (οὐδενὶ δόγματι), but de facto (cf. Ryan [1999]; Berti [2003]), is 
considered as a ‘renewal’ of an ancestral strength of the Council (πάλιν ἴσχυσεν). Yet, as 
for the pre-Drakonian city, the Areopagites were de iure granted with deliberative, political, 
supervisory and judicial functions (as the terms used by Aristotle at Ath. Pol. 3.6 clearly 
suggest). Likewise, the phrase ‘κυρία οὖσα καὶ ζημιοῦν καὶ κολάζειν’ (Ath. Pol. 8.4) ap-
pears to be related to the Areopagite function of ‘νομοφυλακία’ (assimilated to the quality 
of ἐπίσκοπος τῆς πολιτείας) and, at the same time, to activities of ‘political management’ 
(exemplified with ‘the control over magistrates’: cf. Ostwald [1985: 12 f., 40 ff., 518]; de 
Bruyn [1995: 68 ff.]). The Areopagus could give ‘final decisions’ in both judicial and 
non-judicial contexts, so that punishments and fines could be provided either in ‘binding 
judgments’, or in ‘authoritative political orders’.
10. All this implies a general Areopagite jurisdiction extended over all forms of ‘in-
fringement of the existing order’ perpetrated by anyone. Ergo, one can assume, on the 
one hand (μέν), that the Areopagus had the task of ‘overseeing the laws’ (upstream); on 
the other hand (δέ), that its deliberative, governmental and judicial powers were con-
cretely directed to pursue its main institutional aim (downstream). Moreover, even if the 
task of ‘overseeing the laws’ does not consist in ‘watching over the magistrates’ only (as 
Bonner and Smith [1938: 262], as well as de Bruyn [1995: 86, nt. 360], seem to believe), 
other sources permit to include in the former phrase, in its broad sense, the latter (cf. 
Andok. 1.83-84; FGrHist 328 F64): cf., on the link existing between ‘overseeing the laws’ 
and ‘watching over the magistrates’, Cawkwell (1988: 3); O’Neil (1995: 20); O’Sullivan 
(2001: 52 ff.); Bearzot (2012: 29 ff.). Accordingly, it is true that one can suppose that 
among the ἀκοσμούντες tried before the Areopagus (Ath. Pol. 3.6) there could be even 
those magistrates who infringed the established order. Yet, Ath. Pol. 4.4 (that, although 
characterized by a more recent terminology, could really describe authentic Areopagite 
functions: de Bruyn [1995: 70]) seems to give further support to an opposite idea. Here 
Aristotle – with regard to the so called ‘constitution of Drako’ (Rhodes [1981: 84 ff.]; 
Wallace [1993]) – states, on the one hand, that the Areopagus was ‘the guardian of the 
laws’ (as it will be under Solon [Ath. Pol. 8.4], and as it had been before Drako [Ath. Pol. 
3.6]); on the other hand, that it ‘διετήρει τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅπως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἄρχωσιν’ 
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Once ruled out the opinion that the Areopagus was a Solonian creation 
only11, as well as the view that, even before Solon, it heard private cases of 
φόνος (ἐκ προνοίας)12, it is easy to admit that this Council was principally a 
court whose ‘jurisdiction’ over criminal cases was only recognized, and not 
introduced ex novo by Solon. The latter, indeed, just reconfirmed the Athenian 
aristocratic body in its previous capacity, and better specified and increased 
its powers in the ‘public sphere’13. Thus, in seventh century Athens, cases af-
fecting ‘the community as a whole’14 were tried before the Areopagites sitting 
as ‘guardians of the laws’; they were members of a Council that, representing 
the ruling elite, turned out to be the most proper body for taking any ‘public 
action’. This view does gain support from several ancient sources.
(i.e. ‘it controlled that the magistrates exercised their terms according to the laws’ and ‘it 
punished those who, acting in their official capacity, did not abide by the laws’; cf. Ath. 
Pol. 8.1-2, as far as the Areopagite choice of the magistrates is concerned). As regards 
the infringements committed by magistrates during their term of office, anyway, Aristotle 
points out that the aggrieved party only had the right to initiate the procedure before the 
court by denouncing the law under which he was wronged (ἐξῆν δὲ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ πρὸς 
τὴν τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴν εἰσαγγέλλειν, ἀποφαίνοντι παρ’ ὃν ἀδικεῖται νόμον). This 
rule concerning the so called ‘standing to sue’ could prove a substantial difference between 
the function of ‘watching over the νόμοι’ and ‘watching over the ἀρχαί’, since the former 
is related to a public interest (that is to an interest of the whole πολιτεία), the latter to a 
private one (that is an interest of a single ἀδικούμενος). Moreover, since this control over 
the magistrates is directed to punish wrongs already committed against individuals (as 
one can infer from the dative τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ) and to prevent further violations of the law 
(as one can infer from the sentence ‘ὅπως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἄρχωσιν’), it is clear that 
Drako – at least in accordance with the version included in Ath. Pol. 4.4 – neither deals 
with the legal procedure directed to check the conduct of ‘outgoing magistrates’ (cf. Arist. 
Pol. 1274a 15-18, 1218b 32-34 with Poddighe [2014: 195 ff.]), nor qualifies εἰσαγγελία in 
terms of public procedure against ‘societal offences’ (cf., infra, nt. 68).
11. Cf. Plut. Sol. 19.3; Poll. 8.125; Cic. Off. 1.22. Cf., infra, Appendix 1 (α).
12. This view finds, at first, strong corroboration in Plut. Sol. 19.2 (οἱ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστοι 
τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλήν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, Σόλωνα συστήσασθαί φασι· καὶ μαρτυρεῖν 
αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ μάλιστα τὸ μηδαμοῦ τὸν Δράκοντα λέγειν μηδ’ ὀνομάζειν Ἀρεοπαγίτας, 
ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐφέταις ἀεὶ διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν φονικῶν), and in Poll. 8.125 (ἐφέται τὸν 
μὲν ἀριθμὸν εἷς καὶ πεντήκοντα, Δράκων δ’ αὐτοὺς κατέστησεν ἀριστίνδην αἱρεθέντας· 
ἐδίκαζον δὲ τοῖς ἐφ’ αἵματι διωκομένοις ἐν τοῖς πέντε δικαστηρίοις. Σόλων δ’ αὐτοῖς 
προσκατέστησε τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλήν): accordingly, from Drako to Solon the board 
of the ephetai was the only court that heard homicide cases (see, further, Phot. Lex. s.v. 
ἐφέται). Moreover, e silentio, such a reconstruction, confirmed by IG I2 115 = IG I3 104, 
seems to be further supported by Aristotle who, in Ath. Pol., never mentions, with regard 
to the Areopagus, any pre-Solonian jurisdiction over φόνος. On this topic, see further, infra, 
nt. 17 and Appendix 1 (β).
13. See, for instance, Bonner and Smith (1938: 88, 97); MacDowell (1978: 28); Rhodes 
(1979: 104); Ostwald (1985: 7); de Bruyn (1995: 21 ff.). Cf., infra, Appendix 3.
14. See Cohen (2005: 215).
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At first, according to a common opinion, in a period characterized by strife 
between the classes as well as by intra-elite conflicts, Kylon attempted to set up 
a tyranny and, with the help of eupatrid supporters, seized the Akropolis. The 
ruling magistrates together with the Alkmenonid Megakles played a substan-
tial role in the Kylonian affair, for they were responsible for the final submis-
sion of the conspirators. Indeed, if Kylon escaped the siege and fled Athens, 
his supporters were impiously killed: as a matter of fact, they remained as 
suppliants in the temple on the Akropolis; thence, they were persuaded to rise 
up from the altar of the goddess by the false promise either that they would 
not be killed or that they would stand a fair and just trial15. Thus, at least on 
the grounds of the latter version of the promise made to the Kylon’s followers, 
it is worth noting that these testimonia – if read carefully – may suggest the 
existence, even during the pre-Drakonian period, of a procedure before the 
Areopagus against the public offence of ‘attempted tyranny’, if not against a 
wider and vaguer range of offences essentially identified with infringements of 
societal interests. This is explicitly attested in a scholium vetus to Aristophanes 
and implied in Plutarch’s account and in his reference to the shrine of the 
Erinyes (where the Areopagites used to meet)16. 
Secondly, the text of the ‘Solonian amnesty θεσμός’ – as it is found in 
Plutarch – shows, as far as its exceptions are concerned, that, even after it 
was passed, those Athenians who, before Solon’s archonship, had been sub-
stantially rather than formally sentenced to exile for attempting to establish 
a tyranny, had to remain beyond the Attic frontiers, in order to avoid any 
possibility of immediate execution. If the ‘chiastic’ interpretation of this ear-
ly rule is correct (as I am persuaded)17, from the source at issue we can infer 
15. The main sources on the conspiracy at issue are Hdt. 5.71; Thuk. 1.126.3-12; Plut. 
Sol. 12.1-9; Paus. 1.28.1, 7.25.3; schol. Ar. Eq. 445; for the date, cf. Rhodes (1981: 81 f.). 
Herodotus and Thukidides attest the former version of the assurance, Plutarch the latter.
16. Schol. Ar. Eq. 445: οἱ συγκατακλεισθέντες τῷ Κύλωνι ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει εἰς τὴν 
κρίσιν κατέβησιν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ. Such a criminal jurisdiction, indeed, cannot be denied 
by assuming – as Wallace (1989: 24 f.) does – that Plutarch (together with Thukidides) 
does not mention in his account any kind of Areopagite trial (Plut. Sol. 12.1: τοὺς συνωμό-
τας τοῦ Κύλωνος ἱκετεύοντας τὴν θεὸν Μεγακλῆς ὁ ἄρχων ἐπὶ δίκῃ κατελθεῖν ἔπεισεν). 
Indeed, the reference to the shrine of the Erinyes (where the Areopagites used to meet) 
as the place which the Kylonians reached to stand the trial that Megakles had promised, 
can be interpreted as a subtle attestation of the Areopagus as a criminal court (… ὡς 
ἐγένοντο περὶ τὰς σεμνὰς θεὰς καταβαίνοντες, αὐτομάτως τῆς κρόκης ῥαγείσης, ὥρμησε 
συλλαμβάνειν ὁ Μεγακλῆς καὶ οἱ συνάρχοντες).
17. Plut. Sol. 19.3-4: ὁ δὲ τρισκαιδέκατος ἄξων τοῦ Σόλωνος τὸν ὄγδοον ἔχει τῶν 
νόμων οὕτως αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι γεγραμμένον. ‘ἀτίμων ὅσοι ἄτιμοι ἦσαν πρὶν ἢ Σόλωνα 
ἄρξαι, ἐπιτίμους εἶναι πλὴν ὅσοι ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου ἢ ὅσοι ἐκ τῶν ἐφετῶν ἢ ἐκ πρυτανείου 
καταδικασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἐπὶ φόνῳ ἢ σφαγαῖσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἔφευγον ὅτε 
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that, once tried before the Areopagus and once found guilty, those who had 
committed the offence of ‘attempted tyranny’ had been formally declared 
ἄτιμοι, i.e. ‘outlawed’18. Thus, although a trial and a declaratory judgment 
are not necessary requirements19, the incontrovertible final decision given by 
the Areopagite court, in the event that the ἄτιμος’ relatives bring a legal ac-
tion for murder, represents an insuperable defense for the killer pleading not 
guilty (since the killing of him who has been declared ἄτιμος, being lawful, 
does not meet all the elements of the offence of φόνος)20.
Thirdly, one has to focus on a very well-known law reproducing the 
provisions included in some ancestral θέσμια and being still in force under 
Peisistratus. Such archaic rules, certainly antedating Solon and, in my opin-
ion, even prior to Drako’s θεσμοί, stipulated the negative penalty of ἀτιμία 
(in its strongest and earliest meaning) against those who had attempted to 
set up a tyranny or those who had aided in establishing a tyrant21. In other 
ὁ θεσμὸς ἐφάνη ὅδε’. See, for the genuineness of the text and for the ‘chiastic’ interpreta-
tion of the law (which rejects the old view that the courts and their jurisdiction are given 
in parallel order and which, consequently, ascribes the jurisdiction over tyranny to the 
Areopagus only), Ruschenbusch (1960: 132 ff.); Ruschenbusch (1966: 7); Gagarin (1981a: 
128); de Bruyn (1995: 24 ff.); Pepe (2012: 50 ff.). Cf., infra, Appendix 1 (γ).
18. It is commonly accepted that, before Solon, ἀτιμία was equivalent to ‘outlawry’ 
and not to ‘loss of citizen-rights’: cf., paradigmatically, Swoboda (1905), who further 
believes that in Solon’s time ἀτιμία had already evolved to Rechtlosigkeit; contra, see, 
among others, Gagarin (1981a: 118 ff.), who, out of Plut. Sol. 19.4 (Solonian amnesty 
law), assumes that it is reasonable to suppose that ἀτιμία retained its strongest force 
under Solon; moreover, see Carawan (1993: 310 f.), who, mainly on the grounds of Ath. 
Pol. 8.5 (Solonian law against neutrality), maintains that «evidently ἀτιμία still carried 
much of its ancient meaning – public dishonor inviting reprisal and denial of rights and 
legal protections –, yet Solon somehow redefined the rules of self-help and ‘justifiable 
homicide’ in such a way as to alter profoundly the practical consequences of ἀτιμία». On 
this matter, see, infra, nt. 25. 
19. Contra, see Ostwald (1955), who appears to suppose that, originally, the sentence of 
outlawry had (always) to be imposed by verdict of the Areopagus.
20. Cf., on this possibility, Hansen (1976: 58).
21. Ath. Pol. 16.10: ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ περὶ τῶν τυράννων νόμοι πρᾷοι 
κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιρούς, οἵ τ᾽ ἄλλοι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ μάλιστα καθήκων πρὸς τὴν τῆς τυ-
ραννίδος κατάστασιν. νόμος γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἦν ὅδε. ‘θέσμια τάδε Ἀθηναίων καὶ πάτρια: ἐάν 
τινες τυραννεῖν ἐπανιστῶνται [ἐπὶ τυραννίδι] ἢ συγκαθιστῇ τὴν τυραννίδα, ἄτιμον εἶναι 
καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γένος’. The anti-tyranny law (for the text, as far as the pleonasm and the 
shift from the plural to the singular are concerned, see Ostwald [1955: 121, nt. 97]; Rhodes 
[1981: 221]) dates back, at least, to Solon (see Gagarin [1981b: 74]; Ostwald [1985: 8, nt. 
19]; Forsdyke [2005: 83 f.]; Gagarin [2008: 116]). According to a different interpretation 
(see Ostwald [1955: 106 ff.]; Carawan [1993: 149 ff.]; Ryan [1994: 129]; Gallia [2004: 458 
f.]), the law’s authorship must be instead assigned to Drako. Now, I am more inclined 
to agree with the first view, out of the following remarks. Indeed, even if some scholars 
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words, the θέσμια at issue provide that those who uncontestably act like 
public enemies lose any legal and social protection. If, on the one hand, the 
letter of the law implies that this negative status resulted as an automatic 
and immediate consequence of the commission of the wrong itself22, on the 
maintain that the report found in Ath. Pol. 3.4 (θεσμοθέται … ἀναγράψαντες τὰ θέσμια 
φυλάττωσι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων κρίσιν) is historically groundless and assume 
that Aristotle was infering the thesmothetai’s duties only from their name since he had 
no further information about this magisterial board (Rhodes [1981: 102 f.]), it is my belief 
that: 1) in Ath. Pol. 3.4 the use of the very infrequent und uncommon word θέσμια (see 
Pelloso [2012b: 101, nt. 238]), instead of θεσμοί, may support the existence of a further 
source on these magistrates, used by Aristotle; 2) if the thesmothetai were instituted prior 
to Drako (Ath. Pol. 3.4; Thuk. 1.126.8) and, thence, prior to the first written Athenian 
legislation (Ath. Pol. 41.2), a fortiori, the θέσμια, considered in themselves and regardless 
of their contents, cannot be properly identified with ‘written laws’; 3) the θέσμια cited at 
Ath. Pol. 16.10 may reasonably precede Drako’s θεσμοί (contra, Ostwald [1955: 106], who 
erroneously maintains that the written traditional ‘rules’ of Ath. Pol. 16.10 cannot precede 
Drako, since he wrote the first laws); 4) the original terms of such previous θέσμια could 
not be included into Drako’s law-code (as Gallia [2004: 459, nt. 38] believes), since, on 
the one hand, ancient sources do not attest any autonomous Drakonian anti-tyranny law 
(as, on the contrary, one would expect: see, for the multiplicity of Drakonian laws, Stroud 
[1968: 80], and, contra, Ruschenbusch [1968: 33], who suggests that Drako wrote no other 
fundamental law outside of the homicide code), and, on the other hand, once considered 
the anti-tyranny law as a part of the homicide discipline (Ostwald [1955: 108]), such rules 
would not have needed to be reenacted (as, on the contrary, it actually happened); 5) it’s 
likely to believe that Solon first incorporated the traditional anti-tyranny θέσμια (of which 
Ath. Pol. 16.10 attests just one among many rules) in a new, wider, and more detailed 
law (see, for instance, Ath. Pol. 8.4, where it is attested that the Areopagus ‘καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ 
καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου συνισταμένους ἔκρινεν, Σόλωνος θέντος νόμον εἰσαγγελίας περὶ 
αὐτῶν’), perhaps after drawing up its legal corpus, when the conspiracy against the politi-
cal order in force was becoming more and more evident and dangerous; 6) the Aristotelian 
qualification of this law as ‘mild’ does not mean that a Drakonian regulation on tyranny, 
superseded by Solon’s legislation, was reenacted by the enemies of the Peisistratids, about 
eighty years after Solon, thus replacing the less severe Solonian law (see, on this topic, Os-
twald [1955: 109]); indeed, Aristotle «misunderstands the force of its penalty of outlawry 
… assuming that it means disenfranchisement (as it did in his own time), not exile (as was 
the archaic meaning of the word)»: cf. Forsdyke (2005: 266), who further confuses the 
legal concept involving ‘outlawry’ as a sanction with the common practice consisting in 
exile. However, the (Solonian) law found in Ath. Pol. 16.10 was probably never abrogated 
and may perhaps have been just reaffirmed – once fallen into disuse – either when Hippias 
was expelled (about 510 B.C.), or at the time of Ephialtes, if not at the end of the fifth 
century: see Ostwald (1955: 108); Rhodes (1981: 223). 
22. See Paoli (1930: 310 ff.); Ruschenbush (1968: 16 ff.); Harrison (1971: 169 ff.); 
Hansen (1976: 54 ff.); MacDowell (1978: 73 ff.). In the archaic πόλις automatic ἀτιμία 
is clearly attested as a penalty for four offences: changing Drako’s homicide law (Dem. 
23.62); attempting to set up a tyranny or aiding in the establishment of a tyrant (Ath. Pol. 
16.10); remaining neutral in civil strife (Ath. Pol. 8.5); idleness (Poll. 8.42; contra: Diog. 
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other hand, the Kylonian affair and the Solonian amnesty law attest, at the 
same time, that a non-obligatory trial – merely resulting in a declaration – 
could anyhow take place. Accordingly, if the θέσμια cited by Aristotle are 
imagined – rather than as θεσμοί (i.e. ‘general written rules’ enacted by a 
human legislator) – as ‘legal maxims’ or ‘judicial principles’ drawn by the 
magisterial board of the thesmothetai from previous judgments for future 
trials23, one could suppose that in the archaic πόλις a straightforward link 
existed between these ancient authorities (that in later times retained juris-
diction over most public actions), on the one side, and the Areopagus as the 
primitive Athenian court endowed with a judicial power on cases concerning 
the community as a whole, on the other side.
To tell the truth, our sources do not provide any precise indication con-
cerning the exact procedure that, in the late seventh century, one was to fol-
low in order to submit the case to the Areopagus, in the event that an offence 
affecting the community as a whole had been committed. It can only be 
guessed that the aristocratic Council, both as a criminal court and as a body 
that had the general task of supervising the laws24, de facto acted on the basis 
of information laid by one of its members, by one of the ruling magistrates, 
or by one of the private citizens. Furthermore, as we have already seen, it 
is plausible to suppose that it acted in combination with the board of the 
thesmothetai in enforcing its authority by the formulation of judgments and 
the application of penalties. Obviously, apart from the problems relating to 
the actual sources of information which stood at the basis of the Areopagite 
criminal trials and the initiative in bringing a public matter before such a 
court, no detailed mention of the existence of an authentic ‘lay voluntary 
prosecution’ occurs. Indeed, we do not know whether the information was 
conceived of as the act whereby the procedure had to start (that is an ‘oral 
Laert. 1.55; Plut. Sol. 17.2). Furthermore, ἀτιμία resulted also from φόνος, as Solon’s 
amnesty law shows (Plut. Sol. 19.4): those who were subject to ἀτιμία for a homicide and, 
when the law was enacted, were still abroad (either as voluntary exiles or as sentenced 
ones), were not covered by the amnesty. Forsdyke (2005: 11, 83) confuses legal categories 
(such as ἀτιμία) and de facto measures (such as exile), which undermines, at least from a 
strictly legal perspective, for the most part, her argumentations.
23. Here – just as concerns this particular topic – I partially follow Gagarin (2008: 
115): «in the classical period the thesmothetai were closely associated with the law courts. 
If they had a judicial role from the beginning, they may have been writing down estab-
lished practices and procedures, not for publication but just to keep them for use in the 
future. If so, the thesmothetai were not writing legislation, but something like notes for 
their own use» (see, moreover, Gagarin [1981b: 71]; Gagarin [1986: 56]; Sickinger [1999: 
10 ff.]; Pelloso [2012b: 101 and nt. 238]; anyway, against the view that law was originally 
built up by judgments, see Pelloso [2013]).
24. Ath. Pol. 3.6: see, supra, nt. 7.
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indictment’), or it was just the act which could give occasion to a legal ac-
tion before the Areopagite court (according to the principle of discretionary 
prosecution). Furthermore it is not clear whether the role of the accuser was 
played by the informant, or by one of the magistrates, or even by a member 
of the Areopagus itself.
Dem. 23.28 and the Drakonian ἀπαγωγή: some recent interpretations
Out of the remarks included in the previous paragraph, can one assume 
that the archaic πόλις did not know at all the institution of voluntary pros-
ecution? I do not think so. Some testimonia – often underestimated at least 
regarding this topic – might give support to the thesis that even in pre-Solo-
nian times, if the community as a whole was offended, ‘anyone who wished’ 
was allowed to take a legal action, on behalf of the whole citizen group, 
against the public offender.
According to two provisions usually included in the Drakonian homicide 
θεσμός, on the one hand, ‘if someone directly kills the killer or if someone 
causes the killer’s death, when the latter abides by the terms of exile remain-
ing abroad and avoiding border markets, athletic contests, Amphictyonic 
sacrifices, the former is subject to the same treatments as the murderer of 
an Athenian citizen, and the ephetai are to give judgment’ (ll. 26-29)25. 
25. Dem. 23.37: ἐὰν δέ τις τὸν ἀνδροφόνον κτείνῃ ἢ αἴτιος ᾖ φόνου, ἀπεχόμενον 
ἀγορᾶς ἐφορίας καὶ ἄθλων καὶ ἱερῶν Ἀμφικτυονικῶν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον κτείναντα, ἐν 
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνέχεσθαι, διαγιγνώσκειν δὲ τοὺς ἐφέτας. On the meaning of αἴτιος φόνου, 
cf. Pelloso (2012a: 196, nt. 25), who assumes that the phrase, considered per se, just means 
‘he who brings about another person’s death’; contra, see Pepe (2012: 42 f.), who suggests 
that this legal term always implies πρόνοια. Yet, regardless of the problem related to the 
general meaning of αἴτιος φόνου, on the basis of the context – i.e. the so called laws of 
the Areopagus – one can infer that the law providing protection for the exiled murderer 
who abides by the terms of the banishment concerns intentional homicide (cf. Gagarin 
[1981a: 60]; Carawan [1998: 42 f.]; Pepe [2012: 46]). Cf., for the authenticity of this rule, 
MacDowell (1963: 118); Stroud (1968: 53 f.); Gagarin (1981a: 58 ff.); Carawan (1998: 
104); contra, in Ruschenbusch’s opinion, Dem. 23.72 is a very Drakonian law, while the 
other protections, as mentioned at Dem. 23.37 and Dem. 23.44, extended and elaborated 
this rule (Ruschenbusch [1960: 140]); Maschke (1926: 89), persuaded that the original 
word for indirect agency was βουλεύσας, later replaced by αἴτιος, believes that Dem. 23.37 
represents a late interpolation in the law. This provision has recently been re-examined by 
Gagliardi (2012: 53 ff.). In his opinion: 1) «il brano potrebbe apparire in contrasto con la 
ricostruzione del ruolo degli efeti come giudici per i soli φόνοι μὴ ἐκ προνοίας e ἀκούσιος 
(…). Infatti, secondo unanime dottrina (…) la fattispecie in esame in concreto avrebbe più 
frequentemente integrato casi di omicidio premeditato»; 2) yet, «occorre ricordare che (...) 
gli efeti giudicavano non solo i casi di omicidio non premeditato e involontario ai danni 
di cittadini ateniesi, ma giudicavano anche nei processi per tutti gli omicidi di stranieri, 
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On the other hand, ‘if the ἀνδροφόνος finds himself in Attika, it is lawful 
di meteci e di schiavi»; 3) if it is true that «l’uccisore dell’esiliato soggiaceva alle stesse 
norme cui sarebbe stato sottoposto ‘se avesse ucciso un Ateniese’», this implies that «l’es-
iliato in questione, benché originariamente cittadino di Atene, a seguito della condanna 
all’esilio da lui subita non era più considerato ateniese», and «in assenza della norma de 
qua al suo uccisore si sarebbero applicate norme diverse da quelle che si applicavano agli 
uccisori di cittadini ateniesi». This argumentation does not persuade me: it is indeed my 
firm belief that the Drakonian rule at issue shows that in pre-Solonian Athens the Areop-
agus did not hear any case of φόνος ἐκ προνοίας (Pelloso [2012a]), such as many other 
testimonia do: the silentium in Ath. Pol. (which attests that Aristotle found no historical 
grounds for the tradition of early homicide cases tried before the Areopagus); the chiastic 
interpretation of the Solonian amnesty law (which rules out the Areopagite competence in 
homicide cases); the incipit of the Drakonian homicide law, i.e. ‘even if’ (which ascribes to 
the ephetai full competence). At first, as Gagarin (1981a: 40) points out, the phrase ‘ἐν τοῖς 
αὐτοῖς ἐνέχεσθαι’ cited at Dem. 23.37 seems to indicate that the treatment is the same in 
all respects (i.e. with regard to the type of prosecution, as well as to the penalty). Second-
ly, the comparison between the ‘exiled killer’ and the ‘Athenian’ neither implies that the 
former is a normal ‘foreigner’, nor that, without the enactment of this rule, the intentional 
killer of the exiled killer, similarly to the intentional killer of the foreigner, would have 
been subjected to a milder punishment than death. On the contrary, such a comparison 
may have the following meaning: he who ἐκ προνοίας brings about the φόνος of an exiled 
killer abroad can be sued through an ordinary δίκη and sentenced to death by the ephe-
tai, even if the ‘exiled killer’ is an ἄτιμος and, out of previous customary rules, he does 
not enjoy all the rights and all the privileges of an Athenian citizen (Tulin [1996: 39 ff.]; 
Forsdyke [2005: 10, nt. 25]; Pepe [2012: 69]). In other words, in the absence of the rule 
cited at Dem. 23.37, killing an exiled killer, like killing any other outlawed, would have 
been lawful: by introducing this rule, Drako seems to modify – even prior to Solon – the 
primeval discipline concerning ἀτιμία and to make it less severe, at least with regard to ex-
iled murderers. Indeed, on the one hand, before Drako’s legislation, neither legal recourse 
nor private actions against the killer of any ἄτιμος were allowed at all; accordingly, ἀτιμία 
was equivalent to ‘full outlawry’ and all ἄτιμοι were – without any exception – subject 
to self-help execution with impunity. On the other hand, after Drako’s innovation, as the 
provisions preserved at Dem. 23.37-38 and at Dem. 23.28 (τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι 
ἀποκτείνειν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ καὶ ἀπάγειν) demonstrate, ‘licit self-help execution’ (suscep-
tible to escalate into killing) was exclusively limited to the apprehension of the ἄτιμος in 
Attika. In short, Drako innovatively parallels the murder of a condemned killer to the 
murder of an ἐπίτιμος Athenian, provided that the former is committed abroad; more-
over, he mitigates, as far as ‘ἄτιμοι killers found in Attika’ are concerned, the primeval 
discipline, by stipulating the right to kill the killer alongside ἀπαγωγή. With Drako – and 
not with Solon – the concept of ‘outlawry’ starts to change its legal significance (cf. Har-
rison [1971, 169 ff.]; Hansen [1976: 54 ff., 77]; MacDowell [1978, 73 f.]; Vleminck [1981]; 
Carawan [1993: 310 ff.]; Forsdyke [2005: 10 f.]: all these authors, in my opinion, fail to 
remark this plausible Drakonian modification of the primeval concept of ἀτιμία). If all 
that is true, after Drako’s legislation, he who is convicted of attempting to set up a tyranny 
and the condemned killer are not subject to the same remedy (contra, cf. Carawan [1993: 
312]). The life and person of the former (cf. the pre-Drakonian θέσμια cited at Ath. Pol. 
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to put him to death on the spot (ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν)’; alternatively, the 
ἀνδροφόνος ‘can be proceeded against by means of summary arrest’ (ll. 
30-31), and, consequently, by delivery to the proper authorities (that is the 
thesmothetai, the magistrates overseeing the arrest and the execution of any 
returning killer)26. The latter rule shows a clear reference to the remedy of 
the ἀπαγωγή, which – as we can infer from another Drakonian provision 
paraphrased by Demosthenes – might, or might not, be preceded by a ‘pub-
lic denunciation’ (ἔνδειξις)27. Against this backdrop, the following describes 
16.10, as well as the Solonian amnesty law cited at Plut. Sol. 19.4) is forfeited to his captor 
to do with as he wants, both in Attika and abroad (thus, the public offender can be held 
for ransom, maimed, put to death with impunity). On the contrary, the latter, if he does 
not trespass the prohibited areas, is granted with some basic rights, since he cannot be 
killed on the spot, or – a fortiori – maimed and hold for ransom (Dem. 23.37-8). Moreover, 
even in the event that he sets foot ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ, it is plausible to believe that ‘ἐξεῖναι 
ἀποκτείνειν’, only provided that the initiated ἀπαγωγὴ has not worked properly and, 
accordingly, has failed (Dem. 23.28): in other words, ὡς ἐν τῷ α ἄξονι ἀγορεύει, he who 
is incontrovertibly a killer, even in Attika, can only be either ‘arrested’ or ‘killed’ (while it 
is forbidden to hold him for ransom and to maim him to force him to pay: λυμαίνεσθαι 
δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν).
26. Dem. 23.28: τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἀπάγειν, ὡς ἐν τῷ α 
ἄξονι ἀγορεύει, λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν, ἢ διπλοῦν ὀφείλειν ὅσον ἂν καταβλάψῃ. 
εἰσφέρειν δ᾽ ἐς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧν ἕκαστοι δικασταί εἰσι, τῷ βουλομένῳ. τὴν δ᾽ ἡλιαίαν 
διαγιγνώσκειν. See MacDowell (1963: 119 ff.); Gagarin (1981a: 24 f., 60 f.); Gagarin 
(2008: 99); Pepe (2012: 10, nt. 6). Even if one admits that the provision for a trial before 
the ἡλιαία, as well as the formal mention of ὁ βουλόμενος, are anachronistic if attributed 
to Drako (yet, see, infra, nt. 70), once realized that only the first part of the law quoted in 
Dem. 23.28 fits the lines 30-31 of the epigraph (see Stroud [1968: 55, nt. 102]; Sickinger 
[1999: 19 f.]), the following prohibitions (λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν), in my opin-
ion, do not need to be ascribed to Solon. They harmoniously fit the precedent rule (τοὺς δ᾽ 
ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἀπάγειν) as a sort of clarification and specification 
(cf., supra, nt. 25), as well as they are perfectly coherent with some of the aims pursued by 
Drako’s law: it was indeed directed to specify many details still not fixed in the traditional 
oral rules and, thence, to indicate, among other provisions, on the one hand, whether, 
when, and how a killer would be protected and, on the other hand, whether, when, and 
how the protection should cease. Contra, see Stroud (1968: 54 ff.), and Figueira (1993); 
on the later amendments, see Carawan (1998: 73, nt. 78, 90 f., 111, 150); more generally, 
cf. Gagarin (1981a: 23 ff.), and Canevaro (2013b: 48 ff.). See, moreover, Dem. 23.31: οἱ 
θεσμοθέται τοὺς ἐπὶ φόνῳ φεύγοντας κύριοι θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαί εἰσι.
27. Dem. 23.51: φόνου δὲ δίκας μὴ εἶναι μηδαμοῦ κατὰ τῶν τοὺς φεύγοντας 
ἐνδεικνύντων, ἐάν τις κατίῃ ὅποι μὴ ἔξεστιν. Hansen’s interpretation (ἀπαγωγὴ and 
ἔνδειξις are two phases of the same type of process) is here accepted (Hansen [1976: 17, 
24 f., 113 ff.]). See, as regards the link existing between these passages and Dem. 23.80, 
Lipsius (1905-15: 328); Harrison (1971: 17, 227); MacDowell (1978: 122, 140); Carawan 
(1998: 337 f.); Scafuro (2005).
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two recent interpretations of the provisions at issue and presents their flaws, 
while the next paragraph provides a personal reconstruction of this matter.
A. Following Carawan’s overall account, the double provision cited at 
Dem. 23.28 (both allowing self-help execution or summary arrest, and pro-
hibiting to maim or hold for ransom) belongs to a table of statutes consist-
ing in Solonian modifications with a clear cross-reference to the Drakonian 
code28. This provision is considered as part of a wider regulation concerning 
any ‘exiled homicide’ (regardless of intent)29. The traditional remedy sanc-
tioned for the victims’ kinsmen in the original ‘law of arrest’ was strength-
ened by Drako through the introduction of a ‘procedure by warrant and 
arrest’; afterwards, it was restricted by Solon by means of the so called ‘law 
against torture and extortion’30. Indeed, as early as the era of the Drakonian 
homicide-code, any kinsman as well as any concerned citizen would have 
had the right to kill lawfully the ἀπαγόμενος resisting arrest, if the latter 
had been first identified as an ‘exiled homicide’ before the magistrates (Dem. 
23.51)31. To be more precise, the scholar believes that the Drakonian pro-
vision cited at Dem. 23.28 «was originally intended to apply to voluntary 
exiles who had not been formally tried; it would naturally apply also to ac-
cused killers who would neither avail themselves of exile nor come to terms 
with their accusers», while the Solonian amendment implies «that forcible 
arrest to the magistrate, carried out with potentially deadly force, would still 
be available against accused or suspected killers who did not seek refuge or 
legal resolution (so long as they were not subjected to abuse and ransom)»; 
in a similar fashion, in Carawan’s opinion, the Drakonian law referred to at 
Dem. 23.51 «originally applied to homicides who had not been tried and 
sentenced but were, in effect, automatic exiles»32. On the grounds of this 
28. As for the law cited at § 28, «it is a later amendment giving what appears to be an 
accurate cross-reference to the original Draconian table»; «the provisions for prosecution 
by ‘anyone willing’ and trial before a court of the people show that this law is a product of 
Solon’s reform. And the rule not to torture or hold for ransom is consistent with other re-
strictions on the plaintiffs’ claims in the age of Solon. This law was framed as a safeguard 
against attempts by the plaintiffs to extort a higher settlement from an exiled homicide. 
By contrast, the earlier provision ‘on the axon’ to which this later statute refers, a provi-
sion allowing self-help execution or summary arrest of an exiled homicide who returns 
without settlement, is almost certainly an authentic Draconian law: it can be restored with 
reasonable confidence in the fragmentary inscription; the terminology is consistent and the 
practice itself entirely in keeping with the archaic mode of resolving homicide disputes» 
(Carawan [1998: 77]).
29. Carawan (1998: 77); contra, Ruschenbusch (1960: 140).
30. Carawan (1998: 90 ff.).
31. Carawan (1998: 81, 163 f., 335 f.).
32. Carawan (1998: 335 f.).
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reconstruction, he maintains that the common idea that the arrest of accused 
homicides is a late innovation has no basis: the procedure against ‘known’ 
or ‘suspected’ homicides described at Dem. 23.80 is considered as «a direct 
descendant of the ancient remedy»; likewise, «the procedure against accused 
killers that Demosthenes describes» (rectius: the second document preserved 
at Dem. 24.105) follows «a logical progression from the Drakonian proce-
dure», so that «in the intervening period, it is reasonable to assume, there 
was nothing novel or irregular in prosecuting homicide by warrant and ar-
rest»33. This suggestive depiction reveals, in my opinion, some flaws.
It is hazardous to assume that the procedure described at Dem. 23.80 
‘directly’ descends from the ancient remedy cited at Dem. 23.28. Indeed, the 
former applies to the offence of homicide per se, while the open violation of 
prohibited areas turns out to be at the same time an aggravating element of 
the wrong and a legal requirement for prosecution; it is characterized by a 
mandatory trial; the killer is to be brought before the Eleven (as the mention 
to the prison suggests). As regards the latter, on the contrary, the substance 
of the charge is ‘trespass carried out by a killer’; no trial is mentioned at 
Dem. 23.31; the thesmothetai have jurisdiction on these cases.
It is undemonstrated that the Drakonian laws of arrest and of denuncia-
tion originally concerned homicides who had not been tried and sentenced. 
Quite the reverse, if we restore lines 30-1 of the Drakonian homicide law, 
on the basis of the first provision cited at Dem. 23.2834 and if we consid-
er that Drako seems to use the participle ‘κτείνας’ to designate him ‘who 
has brought about another man’s death and has not yet been tried’35, it is 
extremely plausible that ἀνδροφόνος, as a legal term, originally indicated a 
‘convicted homicide’ only (as Demosthenes apparently claims)36.
33. Carawan (1998: 336).
34. Cf. Stroud (1968: 54 ff.).
35. Cf. Gagarin (1981a: 59). As Harris (2006: 404) notes: «the verb (ἀπο)κτείνειν 
in Attic Greek is used to denote the act of causing death. It describes the action of one 
who brings about death by direct physical causality (e.g., stabbing, strangling, beating) or 
by indirect means (plotting, giving orders to magistrates, or encouraging an assailant to 
strike)» (cf. IG I3 104.11-13; And. 2.7; Lys. 13.85-87).
36. Dem. 23.29: ἠκούσατε μὲν τοῦ νόμου, σκέψασθε δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θε-
ωρήσατε ὡς καλῶς καὶ σφόδρ’ εὐσεβῶς ἔθηκε ὁ τιθεὶς τὸν νόμον. “τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους” 
φησίν. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἀνδροφόνον λέγει, τὸν ἑαλωκότ’ ἤδη τῇ ψήφῳ. οὐ γάρ ἐστ’ 
οὐδεὶς ὑπὸ ταύτῃ τῇ προσηγορίᾳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐξελεγχθεὶς ἁλῷ (cf. Gagarin [1981a: 59]). It is 
true that Lys. 10.6-12 and Dem. 23.80 prove that the orators used the noun ἀνδροφόνος 
with a different nuance (Stroud [1968: 53]; Bonner and Smith [1938: 119]); anyway, this 
does not imply that Demosthenes’ definition is just a «sophistry», as Stroud claims. In-
deed, both Lys. 10.6-12 and Dem. 23.80 deal with a particular kind of ‘murderer’, that is 
the ‘incontrovertible murderer’ (or ‘he who ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ ἀπέκτεινε’, ‘he who has man-
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It is unjustified to assume that only the victims’ kinsmen formerly had 
the right to arrest the killer, and that such a right was later extended by 
Drako to any concerned citizen.
The supposed analogy between ‘suspected’ and ‘accused’ killers seems 
to rest upon the unpersuasive interpretation of the second part of the docu-
ment preserved at Dem. 24.105 and of the procedure by arrest depicted at 
Dem. 23.8037, as originally suggested by Gagarin38. Afterwards, maintaining, 
on the grounds of Dem. 23.28, that any citizen was empowered with the 
right to arrest anywhere in Attika him who was simply suspected to be a 
killer, is extremely unlikely, if one focuses on the Drakonian innovations 
concerning the ordinary procedure against homicides39.
ifestly brought about another man’s death’: cf. Harris [2006: 373 ff., 391 ff.]). This is clear, 
above all, from the second testimonium (τὸν ἀνδροφόνον δ’ ὁρᾷ περιιόντ’ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς 
καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν), once read together with Lys. 13.86 (τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔοικεν ἢ 
ὁμολογεῖν ἀποκτεῖναι, μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ δέ, καὶ περὶ τούτου διισχυρίζεσθαι, ὥσπερ, εἰ 
μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ μέν, ἀπέκτεινε δέ, τούτου ἕνεκα δέον αὐτὸν σῴζεσθαι): cf. MacDow-
ell [1963: 120 ff., 131 ff.]; Gagarin [1979: 320]; Volonaki [2002: 162 ff.]). Ergo, since the 
person who has been convicted by the court becomes an ‘incontrovertible murderer’ after 
entry of a final judgment, one can suppose that the second broader meaning analogically 
derives from the first one: from ‘he who is incontrovertibly a killer, after final conviction’ 
to ‘he who is incontrovertibly a killer, even if not tried yet’. Likewise, the clause ‘πρὶν ἂν 
ἐξελεγχθεὶς ἁλῷ’ may stand for ‘until he has been found guilty and convicted’, and for 
‘until he has been without a doubt proved to be guilty’, since ἁλίσκομαι means both ‘to be 
caught or detected (doing something)’ and ‘to be condemned’, as well as ἐξελέγχω means 
‘to prove, to ascertain, to convict’ (cfr. LSJ, s.v. ἐξελέγχω).
37. Dem. 24.105: ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπαχθῇ, τῶν γονέων κακώσεως ἑαλωκὼς ἢ ἀστρατείας ἢ 
προειρημένον αὐτῷ τῶν νόμων εἴργεσθαι, εἰσιὼν ὅποι μὴ χρή, δησάντων αὐτὸν οἱ ἕνδεκα 
καὶ εἰσαγόντων εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν, κατηγορείτω δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος οἷς ἔξεστιν. ἐὰν δ’ ἁλῷ, 
τιμάτω ἡ ἡλιαία ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν αὐτὸν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι. ἐὰν δ’ ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ, δεδέσθω 
τέως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ; Dem. 23.80: ἔτι τοίνυν ἔσθ’ ἕκτη τιμωρία πρὸς ἁπάσαις ταύταις, ἣν 
ὁμοίως παραβὰς γέγραφεν τὸ ψήφισμ’ οὑτοσί. εἰ πάντα ταῦτά τις ἠγνόηκεν, ἢ καὶ πα-
ρεληλύθασιν οἱ χρόνοι ἐν οἷς ἔδει τούτων ἕκαστα ποιεῖν, ἢ δι’ ἄλλο τι οὐχὶ βούλεται 
τούτους τοὺς τρόπους ἐπεξιέναι, τὸν ἀνδροφόνον δ’ ὁρᾷ περιιόντ’ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ κατὰ 
τὴν ἀγοράν, ἀπάγειν ἔξεστιν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, οὐκ οἴκαδ’ οὐδ’ ὅποι βούλεται, ὥσπερ 
σὺ δέδωκας. κἀνταῦθ’ ἀπαχθεὶς οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν, πρὶν ἂν κριθῇ, πείσεται, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν μὲν ἁλῷ, 
θανάτῳ ζημιωθήσεται, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων ὁ ἀπαγαγών, 
χιλίας προσοφλήσει.
38. Cf., infra, Appendix 2 (α).
39. In my opinion, the first two lines of the Drakonian law on homicide show «una 
rigorosa consequenzialità logica e cronologica … : 1. contemplazione, a livello di ‘sostanza’, 
della fattispecie di illecito perseguita, descritta sia con riguardo all’elemento materiale che 
a quello psicologico; 2. indicazione del necessario ricorso agli strumenti processuali medi-
ante chiamata in giudizio dell’asserito omicida, ai fini, in primis, di accertamento, nonché, 
in secundis, di condanna; 3. riferimento alla fase introduttiva in iure dell’ἀνάκρισις, con la 
menzione dei magistrati competenti (βασιλεῖς), sempre che il verbo δικάζειν possa ovvia-
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The whole reconstruction fails, in the end, to consider the problem con-
cerning the authenticity of the document preserved at Dem. 24.10540. 
B. In Scafuro’s view, the relation between Dem. 23.28 and Dem. 23.80 
is differently represented. Once ruled out the full authenticity of the second 
section of the document preserved at Dem. 24.10541 (and, thence, daggered 
the phrase concerning the accused killers: ‘ἢ προειρημένον αὐτῷ τῶν νόμων 
εἴργεσθαι’)42, she maintains that «returned killers who are found anywhere 
in Attika will be arrested ‘to the thesmothetai’, and if they confess, will be 
executed by those magistrates (Dem. 23.28, 31). If they do not confess, the 
thesmothetai will hand them over the Eleven for custody and either the 
thesmothetai or the Eleven will preside over the ensuing trial … for which 
the penalty is death (Dem. 23.31)»; when the law cited at Dem. 23.80 came 
into operation (that is c. 400 B.C.)43, returned killers «who set foot in the 
Agora or in sacred places would additionally be liable to the apagoge of 
23.80 which followed almost the same procedure except that trial is obliga-
mente essere inteso come sinonimo di ius dicere e non di iudicare; 4. menzione dell’attività 
cognitoria e decisoria degli Efeti (fase apud iudicem)»; it is clear that the legislator’s main 
objective is «quello di attribuire al processo (privato) funzione necessariamente sostitutiva 
dell’auto-tutela, senza nessun riferimento ad una medesima sanzione per l’omicidio tanto 
‘volontario’, quanto ‘involontario’» (Pelloso [2012a: 194, nt. 24]). Cf. Phillips (2008: 49); 
Pepe (2012: 14 ff.).
40. See, on the topic, Canevaro (2013a): in his opinion – above all on the grounds of 
Dem. 24.60, 102, 103, 107, and Ath. Pol. 63.3 – the second section of the document pre-
served at Dem. 24.105 «should contain two laws concerned with two separate categories: 
parent abusers and draft dodgers. It should state that, if convicted parent abusers or draft 
dodgers transgress the conditions of their atimia, they must be tried and, if their penalty 
is a fine, they must be imprisoned until the fine is paid». On the contrary, we can easily 
realize that the document at issue states that ‘if someone is arrested for entering where he 
is not allowed, since he is a convicted parent abuser, draft dodger, as well as a banished 
murderer, the Eleven shall imprison him and bring him before the Heliaia’.
41. Scafuro (2005: 67): «a hypothesis of inauthenticity may be radical or conservative 
– radical if we declare 105B in its entirety inauthentic, conservative, if we choose only to 
dagger the clause concerning the accused killer as ‘misplaced’. In both cases, all killers 
(suspected, accused, convicted) discovered in forbidden places may have been arrested and 
brought – not to the Eleven – but to the thesmothetai who are attested as the magistrates 
overseeing the arrests of killers who illicitly return to Athens (Dem. 23.31)».
42. Scafuro (2005: 67): «105B appears inconsistent with what we know of the way 
Athenian law functioned: atimoi elsewhere are denounced by endeixis; the unintentional 
accused killers of 105B might be penalized differently from the suspected, unintentional 
killers of 23.80».
43. Here Scafuro (2005: 65) inclines to follow, although superficially, Hansen’s theory 
(cf. Hansen [1976: 101 ff.]), even if her overall reconstruction appears very different, for 
she broadens the applicability of the remedy described at Dem. 23.80 and partially count-
ers the authenticity of the document preserved at Dem. 24.105. Cf., infra, Appendix 2 (β).
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tory»44. What is more, in her opinion, from c. 400 B.C., even suspected and 
accused killers, once discovered in the Agora and in the holy places, could 
be arrested and imprisoned before trial and then «tried for homicide … and 
penalized with death upon conviction», since the law paraphrased at Dem. 
23.80 is considered as even covering these subjects45. Some weaknesses, in 
my opinion, undermine this conjectural reconstruction.
If the law described by Demosthenes at 23.80 was enacted approximately 
at the beginning of the fourth century B.C.46, this means that for more than 
two centuries the violation of the βασιλεὺς’ prohibition to enter the Agora 
and the holy places47 was practically ineffective without a procedure directed 
to uphold it: thus, such a development looks as an extremely implausible 
one. Moreover, the orator here does not seem to paraphrase a precise statute: 
he rather describes a specific use of the procedure by arrest48.
Arguing that the Drakonian law cited at Dem. 23.28 merely applies to 
44. Scafuro (2005: 66 f.).
45. Scafuro (2005: 61 ff.).
46. This view is countered infra, Appendix 2.
47. See Dem. 20.158; Ant. 6.36; Ath. Pol. 57.2; Lex. Seg. 310.6; Poll. 8.90.
48. Cf. Gagarin (1979: 314): «this is not the text of a law but Demosthenes’ description 
of a procedure»; see, moreover, Hansen (1976: 103): «Demosthenes does not quote the law 
when he analyses the ἀπαγωγὴ φόνου». According to Phillips (2008: 128 f.), Dem. 23.80 
shows a ‘conflation’ of two types of procedure by arrest. This hypothesis is unpersuasive. 
First of all, Phillips maintains that Dem. 24.105 includes valid evidence for reconstructing 
Athenian law (which is not: cf., supra, ntt. 37 ff.); he believes that the decision of the Elev-
en against Euxitheos (Ant. 5) set a precedent that – as confirmed, among other sources, 
by Lys. 13 and Aeschin. 1.90-91 – permitted to label suspected killers as κακοῦργοι, 
alongside thieves, cloak-snatchers, seducers (which is not: cf., infra, Appendix 2). Finally, 
he radically rejects the existence of an ἀπαγωγὴ φόνου, because such a procedure (consid-
ered as contradicting Athenian homicide law and defying common sense) «would allow 
any would-be prosecutor to create and enforce a ban simultaneously»: this rejection is 
groundless, indeed. At first, if the ἀπαγωγὴ φόνου existed, popular judges would not face 
at the same time two issues (as, on the contrary, Phillips states, following Hansen [1976: 
100]), but just one, i.e. the commission of homicide: trespass, as a condition required for 
prosecuting the killer, would have discussed during the pre-trial hearing. Secondly, it is 
not true that, by way of ἀπαγωγὴ φόνου, any unsuspecting person could be dragged out 
the ‘forbidden places’, hauled off to jail, accused of murder and of trespass: on the one 
hand, trespass is a procedural condition, while homicide is the substance of the charge 
(so that they cannot be equated from a legal perspective); on the other hand, only any 
‘manifest killer’ – and not any unsuspecting person – could be licitly arrested through this 
type of ἀπαγωγή (cf. Lys. 13.86; Isae. 4.28; And. 1.91; Dem. 45.81, 54.24; Phot. s.v. περὶ 
τῶν ἕνδεκα; on the exact meaning of the phrase ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ, cf. Pelloso [2008: 72 ff.], 
with Eur. Ion 1214; Hdt. 6.72; Aeschin. 3.9-10; Din. 1.29, 77, 2.9; Dem. 19.121-3). All that 
said, it is unnecessary to deny that Dem. 23.80 properly describes the so called ἀπαγωγὴ 
φόνου, and the scenario of Lys. 13 does not speak against it (see, infra, Appendix 2).
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the returning killer is not convincing: the use of the locative ‘in fatherland’, 
as well as the reference to any ἀνδροφόνος, and not to the φεύγων (either 
upon conviction, or voluntarily), are good hints to suppose that this rule was 
susceptible to apply even to killers who never left Attika49. Furthermore, 
extending the meaning of ἀνδροφόνος to any returning killer – suspected, 
accused, convicted – is unconvincing from a legal and a rational perspective. 
Demosthenes himself (Dem. 23.29) counters this interpretation; and, what is 
more, it unlikely implies that the same rules, sanctions, and remedies apply 
to completely different cases. If a person has been finally convicted, he or she 
is indeed an ‘incontrovertible killer’, while the ‘suspected killer’, at least af-
ter Drako’s legislation, is to be sued through an ordinary legal action only50.
Dem. 23.31 does not attest that a trial had to take place if the arrested 
pleaded not guilty51. At first, the use of the adjective κύριοι suggests that, 
at least before Solon’s procedural reforms, the decision given by the magis-
trates was ‘final’ (i.e. it was not subject to any sort of appeal or referral)52. 
Secondly, this reading is not consistent with the right stipulated for the 
ἀπάγων and for the ἐνδεῖξας at Dem. 23.28 and at Dem. 23.51. Thirdly, 
several testimonia show that the phrase ‘θανάτῳ ζεμιοῦσθαι’, confronted 
with ‘κρίνεσθαι’ and ‘εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον’, may well imply ‘execu-
tion without trial’, regardless of the exact procedure initiated53. Finally, as 
far as I know, our sources do not provide any evidence of trials of killers 
returning to Attika.
49. Even Gagarin (1979: 316) believes that the rule applies to «anyone in exile for 
homicide who returned to Attica». Hansen (1976: 108 f.) gives a full catalogue of exiles 
for homicide (implying that the rule cited at Dem. 23.28 concerns returning killers only): 
«to set foot in Attika was forbidden on pain of death for any person who had been a) 
sentenced in absentia to death for murder of an Athenian citizen, b) sentenced to exile for 
life for attempted murder of an Athenian or murder of a metic; and c) sentenced to tem-
porary exile for unpremeditated homicide».
50. Phillips (2008: 49); Pelloso (2012a: 194, nt. 24); Pepe (2012: 14 ff.).
51. Cf. Hansen (1976: 108), who assumes that «when arrested, the accused could de-
mand to be brought before the court if he denied that he had previously been condemned 
to death for homicide». Carawan (1984: 118) maintains that it is not accurate to regard 
this procedure as execution without trial, since Demosthenes makes it clear that the ac-
cused must be first convicted and then if a convicted murderer returns from exile it is the 
office of thesmothetai to carry out the sentence. This interpretation actually fails to take 
into due account the real substance of the charge (that is ‘trespass’ carried out by a ban-
ished killer, and not ‘homicide per se’: cf. Scafuro [2005: 60]); moreover, it seems to imply 
that the rule described at Dem. 23.31 only applies to killers previously sentenced to death 
in absentia (what is not likely: cf. Hansen [1976: 107 f.]). Contra, in favor of ‘execution 
without trial’, cf. Lipsius (1905-15: 328); MacDowell (1963: 140); Phillips (2008: 122).
52. Ath. Pol. 3.5.
53. Aeschin. 1.91, 113; Ath. Pol. 52.1; Lyk. 1.117.
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Τhe above-mentioned reconstruction does not gain any support from 
the procedure by arrest depicted at Dem. 23.80. In this passage the orator 
exclusively states that the victim’s kinsmen have the right to arrest the killer 
under the condition that the latter trespasses the Agora or the holy places, if 
they do not know how to start the ordinary legal remedies, or if the deadline 
is expired, or if they do not want to sue the killer following the ordinary pro-
cedure. In other words, Demosthenes: a) clearly describes the ἀπαγωγὴ as 
an alternative remedy to the ordinary action for homicide; b) implies that all 
those who can start a δίκη φόνου can also start an ἀπαγωγή, provided that 
a further legal condition required for prosecution occurs; c) does not exclude 
that the procedure by arrest is available to any citizen (as the penalty for 
failing to win one fifth of the votes seems to demonstrate)54; d) suggests that 
this type of ἀπαγωγὴ can be initiated only if the arrested has been neither 
accused and formally barred by the βασιλεὺς’ proclamation, nor sentenced 
by the proper judges.
The supposed diversification and overlap between Dem. 23.28 and Dem. 
23.80 are inconsistent. On the one side, it is undeniable that both rules could 
apply to killers who never left Attika. On the other side, it is equally true 
that the former testimonium comprises an ancient law dating back to the 
Drakonian code and applying to ‘condemned killers’ only, while the latter 
describes a more recent procedure (which came into operation during the 
fifth century) available against ‘suspected killers’ only. 
Dem. 23.28 and Dem. 23.80: some personal remarks
Once dismissed the authenticity – at least – of the second section of the 
document preserved at Dem. 24.10555; once assumed that Dem. 23.80 does 
not describe a new statute, but a particular use of the procedure by arrest 
against killers56; once rejected the existence of a procedure by arrest direct-
ed to prosecute a murderer as a κακοῦργος57; in the light of the previous 
assumptions one can put forward the following hypothetical reconstruction. 
Originally, the provisions cited at Dem. 23.28, 31, 51 (τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνδροφόνους 
ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ καὶ ἀπάγειν; οἱ θεσμοθέται τοὺς ἐπὶ 
54. See, contra, Evjen (1970: 409). 
55. Cf., supra, ntt. 37 ff. and Appendix 2. Regardless of whether one shares the view 
supporting the radical inauthenticity of the document preserved at Dem. 24.105 (Canevaro 
[2013a]), or considers such a document only partially inauthentic (Scafuro [2005: 67]), 
it is undeniable that in our sources no explicit rule concerning ἀπαγωγὴ is attested with 
regard to the case of the killer accused and banished by the king.
56. Cf., supra, § 2.
57. Cf., infra, Appendix 2.
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φόνῳ φεύγοντας κύριοι θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαί εἰσι; φόνου δὲ δίκας μὴ εἶναι 
μηδαμοῦ κατὰ τῶν τοὺς φεύγοντας ἐνδεικνύντων, ἐάν τις κατίῃ ὅποι μὴ 
ἔξεστιν) were conceived of as measures available against the category of 
‘convicted killers’ found in Attika58. The Drakonian rules indeed referred to 
those who had been banned from Attika, whether the ban was the formal 
punishment inflicted by the judges, or a ‘de facto measure’ voluntarily chosen 
by the defendant in order to avoid the possibility of a more severe penalty 
(that is death) upon conviction. Notwithstanding that, open texture (espe-
cially the use of the term ἀνδροφόνος, the phrase ‘ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ’, the lack 
of the mention of the magistrates with jurisdiction over the arrested) allowed 
for broader applications. 
On the one hand, shortly after the enactment of the Drakonian homicide 
law, a defendant in a δίκη φόνου, once banned by the βασιλεὺς from the 
Agora and from the holy places, could be paralleled to the voluntary exiled 
and to the killer sentenced to exile. The former, such as the latters, was a 
‘banished person’; the former, such as the latters, could be arrested and led 
away before the proper magistrates (likely the thesmothetai), once caught in 
a forbidden place (ἐξεῖναι ἀπάγειν)59; he could even be killed on the spot, if 
he resisted the arrest (ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν)60. Moreover, if the accused killer, 
found in a forbidden place, had previously been denounced to the public 
authorities by means of ἔνδειξις, no δίκη φόνου could be started against 
the citizen who, carrying out the arrest, had killed the ‘trespassing accused 
killer’61. 
58. On the one hand, this category included those who failed to appear for the trial 
and to contest the case; on the other hand, it included those who withdrew from the case 
after the first speech of the claimant: these ‘killers’, accordingly, were adjudged guilty in 
absentia, likely by the magistrate himself (Dem. 21.81; Lyk. 1.117). Cf. Bonner and Smith 
(1938: 120 f.); Hansen (1976: 107 f.); Gagarin (1981a: 59, nt. 82); Thür (1990: 149).
59. The verb ἀπάγειν refers to the ‘procedure by arrest‘: cf., paradigmatically, Antiph. 
5.85, Isae. 4.28, Dem. 23.80, 24.146, 209.
60. Cf., in the same sense, Kennedy (1856: 176, nt. 2). In the light of the word order 
of the first section of the law cited at Dem. 23.28, and, accordingly, on the basis of the 
(syntactical but, obviously, not chronological) priority of the verb ‘killing’ (ἀποκτείνειν 
ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ) over ‘arresting’ (καὶ ἀπάγειν), this interpretation appears to be more 
persuasive than the majority view, which translates ‘καί’ with ‘or’ (Stroud [1968: 54 ff.]; 
Hansen [1976: 16, 107 f., 114 ff.]; Gagarin [1979: 316 f.]; Phillips [2008: 122, nt. 37]). One 
can indeed suppose that the Drakonian version cited by Demosthenes is the final result of 
a formal and substantial development by which the phrase ‘καὶ ἀπάγειν’ was added to 
the original permission: originally the convicted killer could be lawfully killed if found in 
Attika; then, anyone was entitled to arrest the convicted and the accused killer found in 
forbidden areas, and even to kill him in the event that the killer resisted the arrest.
61. Cf., as an evidence of the use of ἔνδειξις against suspected killers banned from 
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On the other hand, during the fifth century B.C., the meaning of the 
Drakonian rules at issue was further broadened, allowing for a completely 
new use of the ancient ἀπαγωγή-procedure. Thus, the rule reproduced at 
Dem. 23.28 (τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ καὶ 
ἀπάγειν), after it was opened to those who were formally prohibited by the 
βασιλεὺς to ‘εἴργεσθαι ἐκ τῶν νόμων τινῶν ἢ τόπων ἢ πράξεων’, started 
applying even to those who had, beyond doubt, committed homicide (as 
the events described in Lys. 13 and the use of the procedure by arrest at 
Dem. 23.80 show)62. An ἀνδροφόνος (i.e., according to the new meaning 
attributed to this legal term, ‘a person who has incontrovertibly caused an-
other person’s death’), although neither formally banished nor tried, could 
be paralleled to a ‘person finally convicted of homicide’ and, at the same 
time, to an ‘accused killer subject to public proclamation and excluded from 
customary places’. Indeed, the former, since he had killed ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ, 
came to be considered an ‘incontrovertible killer’ (such as a convicted kill-
er); moreover, the offence itself came to be considered the cause of the 
automatic and immediate loss of political and religious rights (similarly 
to the magisterial πρόρρησις)63. Accordingly, from an unspecified time of 
the Agora and the holy places by the magisterial proclamation, Suda s.v. ἔνδειξις: εἶδος 
δίκης δημοσίας· ὑφ’ ἣν τοὺς ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰργομένους τινῶν ἢ τόπων ἢ πράξεων, εἰ μὴ 
ἀπέχοιντο αὐτῶν, ὑπῆγον (cf., for the same lemma, Harp., Etym. Mag., as well as Poll. 
8.50). It is worth remarking that the same phrase (that is εἴργεσθαι τῶν νόμων / νομίμων: 
cf. Piérart [1973]) could be applied to persons exiled for homicide (cf. Dem. 23.42; Lyk. 
1.65) and to persons warned off the Agora and the holy places (cf. Ant. 6.34-36, 40; Dem. 
20.158; Dem. 21.114; Ath. Pol. 57.2; Pol. 8.90; Lex. Seg. 310.6; Harp., Suid., Etym. Mag., 
Lex. Sab. s.v. ἔνδειξις). The same expression refers to killers at Pl. Leg. 871a and 873b. 
On this phrase, cf. MacDowell (1963: 26 f.); Hansen (1976: 99 f.); Gagarin (1979: 315 f.); 
Hansen (1981: 17 ff.); Scafuro (2005); Phillips (2008: 129 f., nt. 60).
62. See, similarly, Carawan (2013: 129): «if the participant is responsible for an out-
come that anyone else would reasonably expect, there is all the more reason to credit what 
‘everyone knows’ about his guilt: he is the ‘known killer’, ἀνδροφόνος, even if no court 
has yet condemned him» (cf. Dem. 23.29-41, 46, 51, 80).
63. This means that the prohibition from entering the Agora and the holy places, 
on the grounds of this new interpretation of the Drakonian rule cited at Dem. 23.28, is 
conceived of as being directly derived from the manifest commission of the homicide: cf. 
Hansen (1976: 70). This emerges from Dem. 20.158: ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς περὶ τούτων νόµοις 
ὁ Δράκων φοβερὸν κατασκευάζων καὶ δεινὸν τό τινα αὐτόχειρα ἄλλον ἄλλου γίγνεσθαι, 
καὶ γράφων χέρνιβος εἴργεσθαι τὸν ἀνδροφόνον, σπονδῶν, κρατήρων, ἱερῶν, ἀγορᾶς, 
πάντα τἄλλα διελθὼν οἷς µάλιστ’ ἄν τινας ᾤετ’ ἐπισχεῖν τοῦ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν (cf. Ant. 
6.36; Ath. Pol. 57.2; Soph. OT 236-42). In this passage, the ‘incontrovertible killer’ (τὸν 
ἀνδροφόνον), as soon as the homicide is committed and before a charge is brought against 
him, is stated as being banned from lustral water, libations, bowls of wine, the holy places 
and the Agora, as well as Drako goes through everything that can dissuade people from 
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the fifth century B.C., whoever ‘τὸν ἀνδροφόνον δ’ ὁρᾷ περιιόντ’ ἐν τοῖς 
ἱεροῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν’ has the right to ‘ἀπάγειν … εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον’ 
(Dem. 23.80)64. 
Now, since the Drakonian rules preserved at Dem. 23.28, 31, 51, do not 
identify those eligible to kill the killer or to proceed against him by bringing 
the procedure by forcible arrest65, such a silence can be easily read as a hint 
that the institution of the ‘volunteer prosecutor’ antedated Solon’s reforms, 
although restricted to particular cases. The arrest of the person who turns 
out to be an incontrovertible killer and an ἄτιμος, whether preceded by a 
public denunciation or not, is an alternative to the lawful execution and it 
can be carried out by ‘anyone who wishes’: the provision for this act, thence, 
both implies a further infringement of the law, i.e. the presence of an ἄτιμος 
in Attika (which means that the previous homicide is not the offence at 
issue), and it tends to protect a ‘public interest’ (which means that this new 
breach of the law does not affect the killed man’s kin only)66. 
Public interests and third-party prosecution in the late seventh
and the early sixth centuries B.C.
Our sources show that, during the late seventh century, in some cases where 
the community as a whole is wronged (since the killer represents, from a 
legal and religious perspective, a ‘public menace of pollution’)67, any citizen, 
committing such an offence. On the contrary, Ant. 6.36 – where the orator, in order to 
mention just a ‘suspected killer’, does not use the word ἀνδροφόνος – shows that, as soon 
as a charge of homicide is brought against a presumed killer, he is banished from the 
places and rites listed in the law: ὁ γὰρ νόµος οὕτως ἔχει, ἐπειδάν τις ἀπογραφῇ φόνου 
δίκην, εἴργεσθαι τῶν νοµίµων.
64. Cf., supra, ntt. 25-26. As the law cited by Demosthenes was extended to ‘incontro-
vertible killers’, the right to kill without trial either had already fallen into disuse, or had 
already been repealed.
65. Without any argumentation, Humphreys (1992: 38) and Carawan (1998: 82) limit 
to the victim’s kinsmen the right to kill the homicide and to start against him an ἀπαγωγή 
(or an ἔνδειξις), as well as Evjen (1970: 409) did with regard to Dem. 23.80; see, contra, 
Usteri (1903: 9); Lipsius (1905-15: 608); Bonner and Smith (1938: 121 f.); Hansen (1976: 
108); Gagarin (1981a: 62); Phillips (2008: 79).
66. Usteri (1903: 9): «der zur Verbannung Verurteilte, der im Lande bleibt oder un-
befugt darin zurückkehrt, vergeht sich damit gegen die Gesetze, somit gegen die gesamte 
Bürgerschaft, und nicht nur gegen die Familie, die durch sein Totschlagbetroffen wurde»; 
see, further, Bonner and Smith (1938: 122, 168).
67. Bonner and Smith (1938: 120 f.): «the state now intervenes and executes the out-
law not for the original crime-homicide, but because, being polluted, is a public menace». 
Against the traditional ‘miasma theory’ (i.e. the view supporting the historical connection 
between ‘Athenian homicide law and procedure’, on the one hand, and ‘pollution’, on 
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representing the πόλις, is granted with the power to prosecute the offender 
through those legal means that in later times, compared to the ‘ordinary 
popular action’ (γραφή), shall be qualified as ‘extraordinary’ (i.e. ἀπαγωγὴ 
and ἔνδειξις). All this can therefore be considered a patent model for that 
famous Solonian rule setting, as Aristotle and Plutarch clearly prove, an 
open generalization of ‘voluntary prosecution’: in other words, such a fea-
ture, even though still legally unshaped and formally implicit, was not com-
pletely absent in the spirit of Drakonian law. In the first paragraph, we high-
lighted that, in the event of offences affecting the community as a whole, no 
evidence exactly describes the procedure to be followed in order to submit 
such public cases to the Areopagus. In the light of the remarks included in 
the preceding paragraph, one can accordingly hypothesize both that the ear-
ly aristocratic Council judged on the basis of information laid by ‘any private 
citizen’ (βουλόμενος) who, in the name of the ‘principle of representation’, 
acted on the behalf and in the interests of the community, and that such an 
information was conceived of as an accuser’s indictment. If all this is true 
(or, at least, likely), thence, the Solonian legal reforms concerning litigation 
and procedures just improved what Drako had already shaped, extended it 
and made it less ambiguous. Such a conjectural explanation is corroborated 
by a famous passage of the Constitution of the Athenians: as for tyranny 
and other serious offences affecting the πόλις as a whole (i.e. for public 
wrongs already provided, combated and punished in the pre-Solonian era), 
Aristotle indeed attests the enactment by the late sixth century legislator of 
an ‘impeachment’ procedure (εἰσαγγελία), both susceptible to be started by 
anyone, and allocated to the Areopagus Council for trial68.
the other hand), see the remarks pointed out by Parker (1983), who advances the idea 
that the threat of pollution did intrude upon homicide procedure, but later than Drako’s 
times (see, also, MacDowell [1963, 140 ff.]; Gagarin [1981a: 164 ff.]; Arnaoutoglou [1993]; 
Carawan [1998: 17 ff.]). Actually, the magisterial proclamation against the suspected killer 
was directed to prevent the latter from spreading pollution by contact with public rituals, 
as well as holy and public places (Dem. 20.158); the court at Phreatto seems to be aimed 
at excluding the defendant’s pollution from Attica; moreover, the requirement that trials 
take place in the open air was imposed so that the judges would not enter the same place 
as people whose hands were unclean (Ant. 5.11).
68. At Ath. Pol. 8.4 Solon is granted with the enactment of a new ‘law against the 
κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου’, which stipulated that such charge was to be tried before the Ar-
eopagites (καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου συνισταμένους ἔκρινεν, Σόλωνος θέντος 
νόμον εἰσαγγελίας περὶ αὐτῶν): accordingly, out of the amnesty law and the Kylonian 
affair, Hignett is right when he assumes that «if Solon passed a law on this subject, his 
purpose can only have been to give more precise definition to previous powers of the Ar-
eopagus in this sphere» (Hignett: [1952: 90]; recently, contra, see Poddighe [2014: 197]). 
To some extent, Ath. Pol. 3.6 (concerning, as we have already seen, the pre-Drakonian 
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On the contrary, a different legal gap – which also represented a lack of 
protection in the most ancient θεσμοὶ enacted in Athens – should inevitably 
Areopagus) and 8.4 (concerning the Solonian Areopagus) are very similar: according 
to both passages, the ancient Council gives final judgments, inflicts monetary fines and 
bodily punishments, and has the task of ‘guarding the laws’, i.e. of ‘overseeing the con-
stitution’ (on this equation, see Sealey [1964: 11]). Yet, some differences do apparently 
emerge. Those who are subject to the Areopagus’ final punitive power are labeled at 3.6 
as ‘transgressors of the established order’, and at 8.4 as ‘magistrates who, acting in their 
official capacity, commit offences’ (cf. Piérart [1971]; Ostwald [1985: 12]; de Bruyn [1995: 
69 ff.]; contra, Rhodes [1981: 155], who refers the phrase ‘τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας ηὔθυνε’ to 
offenders in general); the Council ‘manages’ the most numerous and most relevant of the 
political affairs at 3.6, whereas it simply ‘watches over’ them at 8.4 (cf. Ostwald [1993: 
7]); under Solon (who enacted the above mentioned νόμος εἰσαγγελίας), the Areopagus 
started to try those who attempted at ‘dissolving the people’ or ‘overthrowing the people’ 
(that is, although the terminology is patently anachronistic, those who committed crimes 
against the πόλις: cf. Gagarin [1981b: 71, nt. 80]; Ostwald [1985: 7]). On the one hand, 
Solon confirms and widens the aristocratic Council in its previous jurisdiction over ‘public 
cases’ (limited, during the pre-Solonian age, to the only offence of ‘attempt at tyranny’); 
therefore, Hignett [1952: 89], and Chambers [1965: 83], clearly exaggerate when claiming 
that even after Solon’s reforms the Areopagus’ early competence remained unaltered; cf. 
Gehrke [2006]). On the other hand, he establishes a more elaborated procedure, suscep-
tible to be brought by anyone (ὁ βουλόμενος): a (type of) εἰσαγγελία, that is a particular 
type of ‘impeachment procedure’ (see Harrison [1971: 52]). To tell the truth, the reliability 
of the report included in Ath. Pol. 8.4 has been strongly questioned in Hansen (1975: 17 
ff., 56 f.), and in Hansen (1980): the scholar believes, and tries to demonstrate, that the 
εἰσαγγελία was first introduced by Kleisthenes and was always a denunciation to the Ek-
klesia. Against Hansen’s view, in several contributes on the topic Rhodes has put forward 
a different opinion: the phrase κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου, pertaining to a real judicial power 
of the Areopagus, should be explained both as referring to a Solonian law against the 
establishment of a tyranny, and as being a symptom of the disdain of the unconstitutional 
usurpation of power through tyranny. See Rhodes (1979); Rhodes (1981: 156); Rhodes 
(2006: 254); Ruschenbusch (1968: 81 f.); Gagarin (1981b: 75 f.); Gagarin (2006: 264). 
Ostwald, instead, persuasively believes that such a law on εἰσαγγελία was really passed 
under Solon, but, at the same time, maintains that «since later legislation differentiated 
κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου at least verbally from attempts at establishing tyranny, and since 
the law under discussion was not invoked against the Peisistratids after their overthrow, 
it makes more sense to see in Aristotle’s description a reflection of a broader measure, 
designed to protect the public institutions of Athens against any kind of subversion, that 
is against any crime against the state»; moreover, the scholar assumes that the statement 
at issue is anachronistic only «if we understand by eisangelia the complex procedure that 
in the fifth and fourth centuries involved the Council and the Assembly or the jury colts» 
(Ostwald [1985: 8]; Almeida [2003: 65 f.]; on the fifth century εἰσαγγελία against the 
crime of κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου/τῆς δημοκρατίας, i.e. a procedure providing the power 
for any citizen to bring a legal action before the Council or the Assembly against anyone 
whose activities tended to the ‘destruction of the people or of he democracy’, cf. And. 
1.96-98; Hyp. 4.7-8; Lyk. 1.125-26; SEG 12.87). 
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be filled with a supplement of procedural rules. On the one hand, it is 
reasonable to infer from the so-called Drakonian constitution, as a general 
principle (which, if reliable, was very probably reaffirming Athenian ances-
tral traditions), the prohibition of the so called ‘third-party prosecution’, 
since just the person aggrieved is entitled to take a legal action against the 
offender (obviously by bringing the case to the proper forum)69. On the other 
hand, as far as the pre-Solonian legal system is concerned, magistrates were 
entitled to pass final judgments and to impose penalties on their own initia-
tive (even if all this does not mean that, as early as the end of the seventh 
century B.C., only magistrates could give ‘final’ – that is not challengeable – 
decisions), provided that they remain in their own subject-matter jurisdic-
tion and they do not inflict or enforce condemnations beyond the maximum 
amount allowed: before ‘ἔφεσις to the popular court’ was introduced by 
Solon (whether it is conceived of as an appeal of the dissatisfied litigant, or 
as a magisterial referral, or as a veto, or as an opposition to execution)70, 
69. Ath. Pol. 4.4: ἐξῆν δὲ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴν εἰσαγ-
γέλλειν, ἀποφαίνοντι παρ᾽ ὃν ἀδικεῖται νόμον.
70. Ath. Pol. 9.1: τρίτον δὲ <ᾧ καὶ> μάλιστά φασιν ἰσχυκέναι τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ εἰς τὸ 
δικαστήριον ἔφεσις· κύριος γὰρ ὢν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου, κύριος γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας. 
According to the majority view, Solon both introduced the ἔφεσις and newly established 
the Athenian people as a ‘popular court’ endowed with the power of giving final judg-
ments and superseding magisterial decisions: see Lipsius (1905-15: 27); Bonner and Smith 
(1930: 232 ff.); Hignett (1952: 97); Ruschenbusch (1965: 381); Harrison (1971: 69 ff., 190 
ff.); MacDowell (1978: 27 ff.); Rhodes (1981: 160 ff.); Ostwald (1985: 9 ff.); Todd (1993: 
100, nt. 2); Rhodes (2006: 255). Yet, a word by word reading of Ath. Pol. 9.1 leads the 
interpreter to assume that Solon just ‘renewed’ and ‘strenghtened’ an existing body (by 
means of the attribution of new functions and powers), since he is only said to have cre-
ated the procedure introduced by the act of ‘ἔφεσις to the (popular) court’ (cf. Bonner 
and Smith [1938: 158]). For the primeval name of this court, see Lys. 10.16 and Dem. 
24.105, where the two authors, discussing the permanence of ancient language in legal 
writing, mention the name ἡλιαία (word used even prior to the Solonian age in other 
Greek dialects: Hignett [1952: 97]; for a smooth breathing – ἠλιαία – as the proper spell-
ing, cf. Rhodes [1981: 160]). As for the skeptical views of the problems implied in Ath. 
Pol. 9.1, Hansen assumes that Solon already established several tribunals, acknowledges 
that Solon instituted the ἡλιαία as a first instance court, refuses the common view of it 
as a judicial session of the people, and keeps open the possibility that Solon’s institution 
of the ἡλιαία and public lawsuits are fourth-century inventions (Hansen [1975]; Hansen 
[1981-1982]). Osborne thinks that the invention of public actions and the introduction of 
ἡλιαία «have a good chance of being genuinely Solonian» (Osborne: [1996: 220]); Mossé 
accepts ‘appeals’ but considers the popular court as anachronistic, and allocates appeals to 
the Areopagus Council (Mossé [1979: 433 f.]). Cf., for the equation ἔφεσις = real appeal, 
Lipsius (1905-15: 27 f.); Wade-Gery (1958: 173 f.); Bonner and Smith (1930: 231 ff.); 
MacDowell (1978: 27 ff.); Rhodes (1981: 160 ff.); Ostwald (1985: 9 ff.); Todd (1993: 100, 
nt. 2); Rhodes (2006: 255); for the view that identifies ἔφεσις with a mandatory referral 
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magistrates were both κύριοι (i.e. qualified to pass decisions that could not 
be amended or quashed) and αὐτοτελεῖς (i.e. qualified to start ex officio legal 
procedures)71. All this balanced the lack of the principle of ‘third-party pros-
ecution’. For instance, as a remnant of very early magisterial prerogatives, 
during the fourth century B.C. the ἄρχων – who had to take care of children 
without fathers, ἐπίκληρος, οἶκοι left destitute of heirs, and all pregnant 
women who remained in the oikoi of their deceased husbands – was still 
entitled to prohibit anyone from committing ὕβρις to the individuals protect-
ed, as well as to penalize, by giving a final decision, the offender, provided 
that the τέλος imposed by law was respected (i.e. the fine was imposed both 
ratione materiae, i.e. according to the ἄρχων’s competence, and within a given 
value-limit)72. Such a magisterial power, as a symptom of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, perfectly fits the above-mentioned general description sketched, with 
regard to the pre-Solonian era, in the Constitution of the Athenians, as well 
as it is fully justifiable, from a legal and historical point of view, if embedded 
in the early Athenian legal system, where litigation was not still shaped by 
the principle of ‘third-party prosecution’.
Thus, as concerns the law cited by Demosthenes in a strongly amended 
(or transfer), see Wilamowitz (1893: 60); Adcock (1926: 56); Gagarin (2006: 264 f.); see, 
finally, Paoli (1950) and Just (1968), who, on the grounds of Steinwenter (1925: 68 ff.), 
tend to qualify this act in terms of ‘veto’ or ‘opposition’. Cf., for the polysemy of the word 
ἔφεσις, Ruschenbusch (1961); Ruschenbusch (1965); Sealey (1994: 121, nt. 19).
71. Ath. Pol. 3.5: τοῖς μὲν οὖν χρόνοις τοσοῦτον προέχουσιν ἀλλήλων … κύριοι δ’ 
ἦσαν καὶ τὰς δίκας αὐτοτελεῖς κρίνειν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν προανακρίνειν.
72. Dem. 43.75: ὁ ἄρχων ἐπιμελείσθω τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων καὶ τῶν 
οἴκων τῶν ἐξερημουμένων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὅσαι μένουσιν ἐν τοῖς οἴκοις τῶν ἀνδρῶν 
τῶν τεθνηκότων φάσκουσαι κυεῖν. τούτων ἐπιμελείσθω καὶ μὴ ἐάτω ὑβρίζειν μηδένα 
περὶ τούτους. ἐὰν δέ τις ὑβρίζῃ ἢ ποιῇ τι παράνομον, κύριος ἔστω ἐπιβάλλειν κατὰ 
τὸ τέλος. ἐὰν δὲ μείζονος ζημίας δοκῇ ἄξιος εἶναι, προσκαλεσάμενος πρόπεμπτα καὶ 
τίμημα ἐπιγραψάμενος, ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, εἰσαγέτω εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν. ἐὰν δ’ ἁλῷ, τιμάτω 
ἡ ἡλιαία περὶ τοῦ ἁλόντος, ὅ τι χρὴ αὐτὸν παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι. The phrase ‘κύριος ἔστω 
ἐπιβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ τέλος’ is controversial, since it could be translated as ‘according to the 
Solonian class of the offender’, or as ‘within the limits of his competence’; for bibliograph-
ical references and for a summary of the debate, see Harrison (1971: 5, nt. 2) and Rhodes 
(1981: 634 f.). Here, I would like to point out that the source at issue does not mention 
any ‘ἔφεσις to the popular court’; it just deals with a ‘magisterial referral’ in terms of 
εἰσάγειν; the name ἡλιαία does not certainly prove the post-Solonian origin of the rule; 
ergo, if one supposes that it is a pre-Solonian provision, all that means that, after ἔφεσις 
was introduced, even the fine within the τέλος (i.e. the fine imposed by the magistrate 
according to his competence, and within a given value-limit) could be ‘attacked’; on the 
contrary, before Solon (Ath. Pol. 4.4), the person aggrieved was just entitled to take a new 
legal action before the Areopagus, denouncing the violation perpetrated by the magistrate 
(with regard to his competence ratione materiae and according to a given value-limit).
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formulation at 23.28, forbidding any ransom and any related maltreatment 
(λυμαίνεσθαι, ἀποινᾶν) against the murderer who infringes the banishment, 
the lack of procedural protection would obviously have make such prohibi-
tions pointless: once qualified the contents of the rules at issue as consistent 
with Drako’s homicide-code, it is convenient to make a few considerations 
on this matter73. Οn the one hand, the victim, since he is incontrovertibly a 
killer and, as such, an ἄτιμος, is unqualified to start any legal action and to 
appear before the court as a claimant or as an accuser. On the other hand, 
since the offence committed represents an infringement of a private inter-
est only, no citizen has the power to initiate the procedure, no third party 
is allowed to initiate a legal action on the behalf and in the interests of an 
incapacitated victim. In this event, one can suppose that the proper magis-
trates, on their own initiative, would have imposed a penalty, while, under 
Solon, ὁ βουλόμενος was entitled to start a legal action, and the offender was 
condemned by the popular court to pay a fine which was twice either the 
amount extorted or the damages suffered.
In short, Drakonian law, on the one side, even if it did not develop any 
formal and general concept of ‘crime’, treated, from a procedural point of 
view, some offences as wrongs injuring the πόλις (as the wrongs of ‘at-
tempted tyranny’ and ‘breach of the exile rule’)74; on the other side, the 
73. Dem. 23.28: λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν, ἢ διπλοῦν ὀφείλειν ὅσον ἂν κατα-
βλάψῃ. Cf., supra, ntt. 25 and 26. In Carawan’s opinion, the rule that forbids torture and 
ransom is consistent with other Solonian restrictions (Carawan [1993]; Carawan [1998: 
90]; see Gagarin [1981a: 25 f.]). On the one side, it is evident that line 31 of the Dra-
konian homicide-code (IG I3 104) cannot be restored with the same word order of the 
law cited by the orator, since the traces on the stone tend to be incompatible (cf. Stroud 
[1968: 54 f.]); on the other side, the unusual reference to the first axon (ὡς ἐν τῷ α ἄξονι 
ἀγορεύει) immediately after the first section of the law cited (τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι 
ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἀπάγειν) makes it clear that everything that follows in the quotation is 
later than Drako’s θεσμοί. Yet, I believe that the substance of the traditional restoration 
(cf. Ruschenbusch [1960: 140]; MacDowell [1963: 119 ff.]), rather than its form, is still 
valid, likely once the mentions of the ‘volunteer prosecutor’ and of the ‘public court’ have 
been removed (εἰσφέρειν δ᾽ ἐς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧν ἕκαστοι δικασταί εἰσι, τῷ βουλομένῳ. 
τὴν δ᾽ ἡλιαίαν διαγιγνώσκειν: cf. MacDowell [1963: 122]; Pepe [2012: 10]). If Drako 
stipulates that, if a convicted murderer sets foot in Attika, anyone has only the right to 
arrest him or to kill him (if the arrest fails), all this means that the prohibitions included 
in the second (formally post-Drakonian) section of Dem. 23.28 are implied in the first 
(formally and substantially Drakonian) section. The original legal gaps concerned the type 
of punishment for those who, for instance, blackmailed and maimed the convicted killer 
found in Attika (misusing their right to ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἀπάγειν), the legal procedure to 
be followed and the respective ‘standing to sue’ (since the aggrieved party was an ἄτιμος), 
the court before which the matter had to be brought. Solon filled these gaps.
74. In other words, in the seventh century Athens, even earlier than Drako, some 
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magistrates took care of the incapacitated victim (as one can conjecture with 
regard to the convicted killer harmed by blackmail and torture). Solon, fully 
aware of the deficiencies present in the Drakonian system, believed that a 
corrective was anyhow required to meet the necessities of a more ‘demotic’ 
legal system: from a strictly legal perspective, how could an orphan or an 
epikleros take personally an action against the damages perpetrated by the 
guardian75? From a merely factual perspective, how could an old father take 
an action against a son who had broken his duty to support the parents76? 
Moreover, who was the person entitled to bring a legal suit against idleness 
and paranoia77? 
If it is true that all these questions did not find a clear answer in Drako’s 
laws, it is likewise true that Solon did not introduce ex novo any ‘popular 
and voluntary prosecution’. The Athenian legislator – focused on a need 
of solidarity and cohesion in the whole community, rather than on a need 
of protection in favor of the whole community – through the introduction 
of the general principle of ‘third-party prosecution’, diminished the role 
formerly played by magistrates and, at the same time, renewed a procedur-
al feature already existing78: indeed, ‘entitling the volunteer’ (ἐξεῖναι τῷ 
offences were treated as wrongs injuring the ‘community as a whole’, though no formal 
concept of ‘crime’ had been elaborated as a ‘super-category’ (what contributes to under-
mining the conclusions reached by Hunter [2007], who tends to confuse the ‘word’ crime 
with the ‘concept’ of crime).
75. Ath. Pol. 56.6.
76. Ath. Pol. 56.6.
77. Aeschin. 3.251; Ath. Pol. 56.6; Dem. 57.23; Lex. Cantabr. 665.20; Lex. Seg. 
5.310.3.
78. See Glotz (1904); Bonner and Smith (1938: 168); Ruschenbusch (1968: 53); Har-
rison (1971: 77); Rhodes (1981: 160); Hunter (1994: 125); Sealey (1994: 129); Ober (2005: 
402); Gagarin (2006: 263); Wohl (2010: 196, nt. 64): all these scholars, as for the goal 
pursued with the new procedure attested by Ath. Pol. 9.1, agree that Solon did not allow 
anyone who wished to prosecute in all cases, but only in cases where the person concrete-
ly wronged was unable to bring a legal action himself. Other authorities believe that the 
Solonian reform was susceptible to be applied from the beginning to crimes against the 
πόλις: see, paradigmatically, Ostwald (1985: 9); Almeida (2003: 66). Others seem to agree 
with the latter trend, both failing to distinguish ‘public actions against offences harming 
the community as a whole’ from ‘public actions against offences affecting an incapacitated 
party’, and being far from a reasonable diachronic interpretation of Athenian legal proce-
dure: cf. Todd (1993: 100, 111 f.), and Allen (2000: 39, 346 nt. 48). Christ (1998: 119 ff.), 
even if he recognizes the opportunity to differentiate ‘third-party litigation’ from ‘public 
suit on behalf of the city’, maintains that «Solon conceived of volunteer prosecution as 
an act undertaken in the public interest» (see, further, MacDowell [1978: 53]). Obviously 
«other cases, such as adultery and theft, where a public interest seems to have been per-
ceived in addition to the wrong to the individual, support the view that the introduction of 
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βουλομένῳ) ‘to exact a penalty’ (τιμωρεῖν)79 ‘on the behalf of the offended 
private party’ (ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων)80 meant impacting profoundly on 
the γραφαὶ system, and the prosecution by ‘anyone who wishes’ (ὁ βουλόμενος), cannot 
be explained solely in terms of the need to protect defenceless victims» (Fisher [1990: 
124]; cf., moreover, Winkel [1982: 287 f.]; Humphreys [1983: 239]): anyway, this does not 
mean, in my opinion, that ‘third-party prosecution’ is always characterized by a public 
dimension; this just means that popular actions could be undertaken in the view of dif-
ferent aims and on the basis of different interests, depending on the case (ergo, it is surely 
misleading to assume the existence of a mutual link between ‘Solonian public actions’ 
and ‘criminal procedure’: explicitly Vinogradoff [1922: 165]; Calhoun [1927: 6]; implicitly 
Osborne [1985: 173]). The provision for voluntary prosecution on behalf of those who 
have been wronged and are either de facto or de iure incapacitated to start a legal lawsuit 
formalizes in a positive rule a notion of justice interpreted as ‘defense of the weak’: cf. de 
Romilly (1971: 142 ff.); Mossé (1987: 165 ff.); Ober (1989: 217-9); Dillon (1995).
79. On the meaning of this verb and of the noun τιμωρία, see Allen (2000: 50, 51, 61, 
69 ff., 125, 248, 260, 279 ff.).
80. LSJ, s.v. ὑπὲρ (with genitive and metaphorically): in defense of, on behalf of, for, 
instead of, in the name of. Neither Aristotle, nor Plutarch make clear which court, after 
this Solonian reform, tried cases brought by a third-party prosecutor. As regards the So-
lonian allocation of the so called public actions, many authorities don’t deal directly with 
the problem; notwithstanding that, their opinion emerges, more or less clearly, from the 
context of their argumentation, which suggests the belief that magistrates did not give 
judgments at the end of the fifth century (either because of a formal legal prohibition, or 
because of a progressive disuse): cf. Bonner and Smith (1938: 96); Harrison (1971: 3 ff.); 
MacDowell (1978: 26 f., 32 f.); Rhodes (1981: 105); Ostwald (1985: 7 ff.); Hansen (1991: 
189); Todd (1993: 100, nt. 2). Other scholars believe that the ἡλιαία, as a court of first 
and final instance, held the majority of the so called public actions from their primeval 
emergence under Solon. This is indeed a required conclusion, if one shares the view that 
Solon limited the penalties susceptible to be imposed by magistrates with a final judgment, 
and that he prescribed for higher penalties a mandatory ‘referral’ to the popular court: 
cf., for instance, Wilamowitz (1893: 60). Yet, on the one hand, it is unlikely that Solon 
made all magisterial judgment subject to ἔφεσις (where it is plausible that he granted that 
magistrates kept their original judicial powers at least in certain minor cases): MacDowell 
(1978: 30 f.). On the other hand, there are some hints in the sources suggesting that, at 
least in the earliest examples attested, ἔφεσις – regardless of the problem concerning its 
legal nature – was an act of the dissatisfied litigant (Plut. Sol. 18.2). Other scholars have 
achieved the same conclusion through a different path. Allen, for instance, assumes that 
«δίκαι were heard before individual magistrates», whereas «Solon’s introduction of the 
γραφαί was an introduction of a new form of court case», and that «presumably the pro-
cedure would have been modeled, to some degree, on the homicide cases, since they were 
the only form of court procedure already in existence» (Allen [2000: 40]; see, accordingly, 
Ober [2005: 402]: «a voluntary prosecutor could initiate proceedings against another 
for wrongs committed against any Athenian. The judging body to which the prosecutor 
would turn in exposing wrongdoing was the citizen body itself [or some very substantial 
fragment thereof], sitting in a judicial capacity»). Afterwards, she points out that «if the 
γραφὴ was in fact invented to be a court case as distinct from a δίκη, then it is unlikely 
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the jurisdictional power of the Athenian ἀρχαὶ and on their prosecutorial 
discretion; furthermore, it finally involved full protection for those persons 
who had not any ‘standing to sue’ (while ‘popular prosecution’ was previ-
ously related to the safeguard of the community only). 
To conclude, the second of the most populist reforms enacted by Solon 
got each member of the πόλις – regardless of his social status – and the 
entire Athenian community connected with one another81. This measure, 
that Solon would have invented ἔφεσις at the same moment as he invented the γραφή» 
(Allen [2000: 347, nt. 55]). Many legal misunderstandings and many historical mistakes 
undermine all this circular reconstruction. First of all, neither Aristotle, nor Plutarch attest 
a Solonian reform of the Athenian legal procedure concerning the judicial authorities of 
first instance: ergo, as for ‘third-party litigation’ at least, nothing seems to rule out that 
Solon kept on allocating these trials to magistrates, even if Solon grants – in contrast with 
the past – a provision for appealing their judgments, so that they cannot longer be qual-
ified as αὐτοτελεῖς and κύριοι (cf. Ath. Pol. 3.5; Arist. Pol. 1285 b 9-12, 1298 a 9-31). 
Secondly, from both ancient authorities, as far as the second populist measure introduced 
by Solon is concerned, the only noteworthy divide emerging between δίκαι and γραφαὶ 
concerns those who are entitled to prosecute, so that it is just an a priori and groundless 
assumption to maintain that γραφαὶ must be tried before a different kind of court, since no 
functional link exists between the second Solonian reform and the rule to the effect that a 
new tribunal, whose new function was limited to hearing cases object of ἔφεσις, was added 
to the magisterial and Areopagite jurisdiction. Third, it is not true, as it has been already 
seen, that homicide cases were the sole court-cases existing at the beginning of the sixth 
century B.C.: in fact, cases affecting the community, as attempted tyranny, were held before 
the Areopagus since the pre-Drakonian age. Fourth, the skeptical view, supporting the late 
(i.e. Kleisthenic) introduction of ἔφεσις, cannot be shared, since it is just logically drawn 
from the unfounded belief that the point of the γραφαὶ was to distinguish between court 
and non-court procedures and, what is more, since it is contradicted by our extant sources.
81. Ath. Pol. 9.1; Plut. Sol. 18.5. It is commonly accepted that Solon introduced the so 
called ‘public actions’: see Rhodes (2006: 255). What is controversial is the role played by 
the magistrates as far as third-party litigation is concerned (cf., supra, nt. 78). To sum up: 
nothing prevents from assuming that, during the sixth century B.C., Athenian magistrates, 
even after Solon’s reforms, kept their power to give judgments, not only as far as private 
δίκαι were concerned, but also if a third-party brought a legal action before them in the 
interest and on the behalf of an incapacitated individual, or if ὁ βουλόμενος took public 
charges. Afterwards, in opposition to the past, the convicted offender was entitled to ap-
peal to the people against their decision, and it is obvious that ἔφεσις was constantly de-
manded in the most serious cases, so that all this may well explain why magistrates never 
seem to have acquired the power to pass capital sentences. The Areopagus, as the most an-
cient criminal court, hears εἰσαγγελίαι, judges the most serious offences against the πόλις, 
passes judgments that even after Solon keep on being final. This system probably changes 
at the beginning of the fifth century B.C. (if not a short earlier), when a law including the 
so called ‘δῆμος πληθύων provisions’ was first enacted. On the one hand, this formalized 
the disuse of giving capital judgments or of inflicting very high monetary penalties at the 
magisterial hearing, since during the seventh century such a judicial practice, although 
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on the one hand, perfectly fitted, from a procedural perspective, the more 
general μεταβολὴ of the constitutional system promoted by the legislator on 
the way towards democracy and against the earlier oligarchic and magis-
trate-centric τάξις82; on the other hand, it constituted the legislative attempt 
to ensure that the lowly citizens and the nobles received by law equal pre-
rogatives (as ‘popular prosecutors’, and as ‘judges’): what Solon himself 
seems to boast in his poetry83.
Key-words: Attempted tyranny; Drakonian procedures; magisterial powers 
and incapacitated victims; offences against the community; Solonian re-
forms; ‘third-party prosecution’; ἀπαγωγὴ against killers; ὁ βουλόμενος.
consistent de iure with magistrates’ powers, became de facto worthless because of, and as 
a result of, the Solonian ἔφεσις provision. On the other hand, it brought to an end the 
Areopagite criminal jurisdiction over the most serious offences against the community as 
a whole: the ancient ‘impeachment’ procedure ceases to be a fully aristocratic prerogative.
82. Cf. Ath. Pol. 41.2; Arist. Pol. 1273b 35-40: see Poddighe (2014: 139 ff.), with fur-
ther bibliography.
83. Sol. fr. 36.18-20 (West): θεσμοὺς δ’ ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε κἀγαθῷ, / εὐθεῖαν εἰς 
ἕκαστον ἁρμόσας δίκην, / ἔγραψα. In my opinion, it is not unsound to interpret these 
lines in the light of an implicit mention to the written laws which established ‘pupular 
prosecution by anyone who wishes’ (ὁ βουλόμενος), as well as ‘ἔφεσις’ to the popular 
court (ἡ ἡλιαία; cf. Ath. Pol. 7.3: the θῆτες were not qualified to hold office, but received 
the right to sit in the assembly and in the courts). This reading seems to be preferable to 
the generic view proposed by Almeida (2003: 231 ff.), who believes that the lines at issue 
suggest that Solon attempted a re-institution of the πόλις idea «at the level of the official 
agencies of political authority», and that the aim of his reforms was «to create conditions 
within the πόλις where the norms of political δίκη would apply equally to all citizens». 
Indeed, such laws were enacted, so that all the Athenians became similar, at least to some 
extent: Solon neither introduced or anticipated the concept of ‘absolute equality’ (ἵσον: 
cf. Raaflaub [1996]; Mülke [2002: 389]), nor enacted laws which were fair to the lower 
and upper classes alike (Rhodes [1981: 177]). He just made ‘peers of unequals’, as far as 
the two above-mentioned measures are concerned (cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi [2010: 474 ff.]).
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Areopagus and ephetai before Solon.
α) The view that the Areopagus was a Solonian creation seems to be shared 
by Pepe (2012: 62), who, besides Plut. Sol. 19.3, Poll. 8.125, and Cic. Off. 
1.22, even quotes Arist. Pol. 1273 b: «verisimilmente con Solone … venne 
istituito il Tribunale dell’Areopago e venne stabilita la sua competenza in 
materia di omicidio volontario». Yet, this reconstruction is patently contra-
dicted, as Plutarch himself admits, among the other sources, by the Solonian 
amnesty law (Plut. Sol. 19.4), and most scholars support the existence of the 
Areopagus even before Solon. Wallace (1989: 7 ff.), Ryan (1994), Roselli della 
Rovere (1999), believe that the aristocratic βουλή – composed by ephetai – 
was only a site for judicial trials, in particular for homicide. Ostwald (1985: 
7), on the contrary, shares the thesis of the existence of early deliberative and 
judicial powers (cf. Bonner and Smith [1938: 88 ff.]; de Bruyn [1995: 21 
ff.]); he therefore assumes that «with the benefit of the hindsight that later 
developments provide, it is possible to distinguish three areas of public law 
in which we ascribe jurisdiction to the Areopagus: it tried crimes against the 
state, it held magistrates accountable for their official acts (euthyna), and it 
scrutinized elected officials before they embarked upon their term of office to 
ensure that they possessed the formal qualifications for the office to which 
they had been elected (dokimasia)»; the scholar further believes that from the 
beginning the Areopagus even held trials for all those offences that, under 
the presidency of the archon-king, it will try during the classical era, that 
is – beyond homicide and wounding – arson and destruction of sacred olive 
trees (cf. Ostwald [1985: 9]; Busolt and Swoboda [1926: 2.803 ff.]; Hignett 
[1952: 80]; Stroud [1968: 36]; MacDowell [1978: 71]). Others have express-
ly rejected the view that the aristocratic βουλὴ was originally a court with 
jurisdiction over homicide cases, thus implying its political functions and 
its judicial powers concerning ‘public issues’ only (cf. Ruschenbusch [1960: 
129 ff.]; Gagarin [1981a: 130]; Sealey [1983: 265 ff.]; Carawan [1998: 89 ff.]; 
Westbrook [2009]).
β) The theory that denies any Areopagite jurisdiction over homicide cas-
es before Solon has been recently challenged by Gagliardi (2012). In his 
opinion, before Solon: 1) the ephetai (that are not considered Areopagites, 
as Wallace [1989: 11 ff.] claims) just tried cases of φόνος μὴ ἐκ προνοίας; 
2) the rules concerning Areopagus and φόνος ἐκ προνοίας were inscribed 
in IG I2 115 below the preserved section on ‘unintentional homicide’; 3) 
‘καὶ ἐάν’ (IG I2 115, l. 11) does not mean ‘even if’, but ‘and if’ (so that the 
first sentence cannot be conceived of as treating φόνος ἐκ προνοίας by im-
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plication); 4) Areopagite jurisdiction over homicide cases is attested by the 
Solonian amnesty law; 5) Areopagite jurisdiction over homicide cases is sup-
ported by mythical tradition. This thesis is not fully persuasive. At first, the 
argument under 2) is just a hypothetical proposal put forward without any 
documentary evidence and, as concerns 5), one can object that the myths on 
early homicide trials at the Areopagus are legally inaccurate (for they depict 
cases of lawful, intentional and unintentional homicides, all tried before the 
ancient aristocratic βουλή) and, such as post-Drakonian inventions, they only 
attest the respect this ancient court «was accorded in the fifth century and 
later» (Gagarin [1981a: 125 f.]). Accordingly I will focus on 3) and 4), in or-
der to refute 1). In Gagliardi’s opinion, the meaning ‘and if’ attributed to the 
nexus ‘καὶ ἐάν’ gains support from the statute – erroneously described as a 
decree – proposed by Timokrates and cited at Dem. 24.39 and at Dem. 24.71 
(Τιμοκράτης εἶπεν, καὶ εἴ τινι τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῷ δημοσίῳ προστετίμηται 
κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατὰ ψήφισμα δεσμοῦ ἢ τὸ λοιπὸν προστιμηθῇ, εἶναι αὐτῷ ἢ 
ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἐγγυητὰς καταστῆσαι τοῦ ὀφλήματος, οὓς ἂν ὁ δῆμος 
χειροτονήσῃ, ἦ μὴν ἐκτείσειν τὸ ἀργύριον ὃ ὦφλεν). The comparison between 
Timokrates’ law and IG I2 115, l. 11 is not sound, in the light of the structure 
of the two rules at issue. As for the Drakonian law’s incipit, the protasis is 
a negative statement and the apodosis provides a negative consequence for 
the offender (killer); as for the law proposed by Timokrates, the protasis is 
an affirmative sentence, and the apodosis includes a positive provision for the 
offender (public debtor). Moreover, Gagliardi seems to misunderstand the 
contents of the law challenged by Demosthenes and its relation with previ-
ous Athenian regulations: the orator indeed assumes that imprisonment is 
a possible ‘additional penalty’ stipulated by Solon and susceptible to be im-
posed by the court for serious categories of criminals (cf. Dem. 24.103). More 
precisely, if someone serves as a judge while being a state debtor or another 
type of ἄτιμος, he is subject to ἔνδειξις and then tried; if convicted, the court 
is to assess the penalty, and if a monetary fine is inflicted, he can be further 
sentenced to imprisonment until the fine is paid (Ath. Pol. 63.3: cf. Mirhady 
[2005]; Canevaro [2013a: 37 ff.]). Ergo, I believe that Demosthenes vigorously 
criticizes Timokrates, since the latter, through his law, allowed criminals like 
state debtors to avoid prison by presenting sureties. And this possibility was 
granted ‘even if the imprisonment itself had been inflicted by the popular 
court as an additional penalty, according to prior laws or decrees in force’. In 
other words, the ‘even if’ clause in Timokrates’ law seems to be directed to 
emphasize the introduction of an ‘exceptional discipline’ which substantially 
bypasses the popular judgment (προστίμησις) and contradicts prior legal 
rules (νόμοι and ψηφίσματα). As regards the argument sub 4), Gagliardi as-
sumes that «data la somiglianza tra il testo dell’amnistia soloniana e il decre-
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to di Patroclide, sembra più verosimile che per entrambi i testi sia proponibile 
la stessa interpretazione, che abbiamo già fornito e che mostra che l’Areopago 
già prima di Solone giudicava nei processi per φόνος ἐκ προνοίας». This 
reasoning is not convincing. At first, Gagliardi primarily founds his view on 
a section of a ‘document’ preserved at And. 1.78, neglecting the hypothesis 
that the text of the decree is only an inaccurate forgery. As Canevaro and 
Harris (2012: 109) maintain (highlighting the existence of many incongruities 
between this text and the ordinary usage of inscribed decrees and procedural 
laws, as well as specifying that the insert in the manuscript is far from being 
a faithful transcription of the original): «the person who composed the in-
serted document drew on the Solonian law quoted in Plutarch but introduced 
errors when trying to adjust its terms to a different context. Every time the 
text of the inserted document differs from Plutarch’s text, the former contains 
corruptions and impossible Greek. The person who composed the document 
may have found the Solonian law in Plutarch or in a compilation of Solon’s 
laws». Secondly, even if the document at issue were authentic, some doubts 
would still remain. One must observe that, when the decree was enacted 
(405 B.C.), the Areopagus undeniably tried cases of φόνος ἐκ προνοίας, 
while, as regards the pre-Solonian era, this competence is sub iudice. Ergo, it 
is not correct to provide an earlier statute with the same legal sense attribut-
ed to a more recent one, even if the latter derives its formal structure from 
the former. Moreover, on the one side, the Solonian amnesty law mentions 
three courts, Areopagus, ephetai, Prytaneion (ἀτίμων ὅσοι ἄτιμοι ἦσαν πρὶν 
ἢ Σόλωνα ἄρξαι, ἐπιτίμους εἶναι πλὴν ὅσοι ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου ἢ ὅσοι ἐκ τῶν 
ἐφετῶν ἢ ἐκ πρυτανείου καταδικασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων …), while, on 
the other side, the decree of Patrokleides cites four courts (adding to the list 
the Delphinion: cf. Pepe [2012: 195 ff.]); both indeed exclude from reprieve 
those who have been convicted of homicide, slaughter, tyranny (… ἐπὶ φόνῳ 
ἢ σφαγαῖσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἔφευγον ὅτε ὁ θεσμὸς ἐφάνη ὅδε). Thus, one 
can reasonably suppose that, between Solon and Patrokleides, the judicial 
competence underwent some modification, if one believes that the ephetai did 
not meet at the Delphinion (cf. Gagliardi [2003]); otherwise, if one believes 
that the ephetai even judged at the Delphinion (cf. MacDowell [1978: 28]), 
the mention of this court is totally redundant and ungrounded, so that the 
source itself turns out to be less reliable.
γ) The amnesty law (cf., supra, nt. 17), in my opinion, argues against 
those who toto coelo identify the ephetai with the members of the Areopa-
gus (cf. Wallace [1989: 7 ff., 12 ff.]; Roselli della Rovere [1999]), whereas it 
does not rule out – at least per se – the thesis that the ephetai represented 
a ‘commission’ of Areopagites (Bonner and Smith [1938: 99]). In Wal-
lace’s opinion, before Solon: 1) the Areopagus was just a court that tried 
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homicide cases; 2) it was composed by the fifty-one ephetai established by 
Drako c. 621 B.C.; 3) once assumed that the Areopagus and the ephetai 
were the same body, by process of elimination he hypothesizes that trials 
for tyranny were held at the Prytaneion. The rejection of the view sub 1) 
is explained supra at nt. 12 and in Appendix 1 (β): many data, on the one 
hand, allow to conceive of the Areopagus as a βουλὴ with deliberative and 
supervisory functions, and as a court trying cases involving public interests; 
on the other hand, the sole ephetic jurisdiction over homicide cases is well 
attested, as far as the pre-Solonian age is concerned. Yet, if 2) were true, 
the criticisms against Gagliardi would turn out to be ultimately pointless. If 
Phot. s.v. ἐφέται appears to be completely irrelevant, it is false that Harp. 
s.v. ἐφέται (Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀριστοκράτους. οἱ δικάζοντες τὰς ἐφ’ 
αἵματι κρίσεις ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ καὶ ἐπὶ Πρυτανείῳ καὶ ἐπὶ Δελφινίῳ καὶ ἐν 
Φρεαττοῖ ἐφέται ἐκαλοῦντο) poses no obstacle to the identification of Ar-
eopagites and ephetai, since the lemma explicitly rules out that ephetai sat 
at the Areopagus (although it mistakenly maintains a regular connection 
between these judges and the Prytaneion: cf. Gagliardi [2003]). What is 
more, this view does not gain support from Poll. 8.125 (cf., supra, nt. 12). 
Out of this lemma, one can indeed assume that the Areopagite jurisdiction 
over φόνος is more recent than the ephetic one (since, originally, only the 
ephetai ἐδίκαζον δὲ τοῖς ἐφ’ αἵματι διωκομένοις in five different tribunals) 
and that it was Solon that added, as a homicide court, the Areopagus to the 
ephetai (Σόλων δ’ αὐτοῖς προσκατέστησε τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλήν). 
Very likely Pollux just meant that originally each ephetic tribunal tried one 
of the five types of φόνος, i.e. ‘lawful’, ‘committed by exiles’, ‘committed 
by unknown people’ or ‘not committed by human beings’, ‘unintentional’, 
‘intentional’ (rather than the ephetai, already in the period between Drako 
and Solon, sat in Athens’ classical homicide courts, i.e. Delphinion, Phreato, 
Prytaneion, Palladion, and – obviously – the ‘hill of Ares’). Furthermore, 
he states that under Solon the Areopagus started to hear homicide cases 
‘alongside the ephetai’, implying that the primeval jurisdiction over φόνος 
must have somehow undergone a change (rather than the Areopagus, from 
Solon on, represented a ‘sixth homicide court’ alongside the precedent five 
courts that were composed by ephetai). Cf., on the lemma, Wallace (1989: 
12); Carawan (1998: 14, nt. 20); see, moreover, Phot. Bibl. 279.535 a 32-4. 
Finally, FGrHist 324 F4a and 328 F20b (Androtion and Philochoros quoted 
by Maximus the Confessor in his prologue to Dionysios the Areopagite) are 
not decisive at all. This source just attests that in a first phase, likely before 
Drako, the Areopagus was constituted from (or composed of) the nine ap-
pointed archons (ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἐννέα καθισταμένων ἀρχόντων), while, in a 
second phase, ‘fifty-one distinguished men’ sat at the Areopagus (ἐξ ἀνδρῶν 
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περιφαεστέρων πεντήκοντα καὶ ἐνός): cf. Bonner and Smith (1938: 99 f.); 
Wallace (1989: 14 ff.); Carawan (1998: 14 f.); Pepe (2012: 52 f.). Actually, 
the account sketched by Maximus the Confessor could only mean that, at 
least between Drako and Solon (since it is commonly maintained that from 
Solon on the Areopagite Council included all former archons: cf., on the 
grounds of Plut. Sol. 19.1, Wallace [1989: 52 ff.]), the courts trying cases of 
‘intentional’ and ‘unintentional’ φόνος, on the one side, and the Areopagus, 
on the other side, are found to have – by chance – the same number of mem-
bers (and Schol. Aeschyl. Eum. 743, according to Petit’s emendation, could 
be read in the same fashion).
Appendix 2: ἀπαγωγὴ against accused and suspected killers
α) Gagarin (1979) highlighted some presumed similarities between the pro-
cedures described at Dem. 24.105 (against parent abusers, draft dodgers, 
persons banished from the ‘νόμοι’: cf., supra, nt. 37) and at Dem. 23.80 (kill-
ers who find themselves ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν: cf., supra, nt. 
37); he then tried to assimilate such two types of remedies and to annihilate 
their (more than evident) differences. In Gagarin’s opinion, Demosthenes, 
in the second testimonium, is just reporting the penalty usually assessed by 
the judges (that is death); the absence of the mention of a 1000 drachmai 
fine for the unsuccessful prosecutor at Dem. 24.105 is due to an intention-
al abridgment; both sources may deal with an arrest carried out after the 
magisterial πρόρρησις, the mention of which the orator has omitted in the 
paraphrase included in Dem. 23.80 (or, alternatively, Gagarin [1979: 320] 
hypothesizes that an arrest without any proclamation could be carried out 
under the condition that the killing was ‘public and manifest’). At first, this 
reconstruction is not persuasive from a rational perspective. If it were true, 
indeed, it would have been advantageous for any killer to violate the forbid-
den places (or to commit publicly and manifestly a homicide): the penalty 
for ‘ordinary homicide’ was either death or exile, while a ‘trespassing killer’ 
(or a ‘flagrant killer’), once arrested, could even get off with a monetary fine. 
Secondly, it is not exact from a legal perspective: Dem. 23.80 clearly attests 
that trespass is not the substance of the charge (as, on the contrary, Gagarin 
[1979: 315] is inclined to maintain, followed by Volonaki [2002: 153]), but 
only a ‘condition of arrest’ (on the basis of Lys. 13 and Dem. 23.80, Car-
awan [1998: 362 f.] rightly concludes that trespass was a requirement for 
the process, but he erroneously assumes that the ‘ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ condition’ 
involved the arrest, rather than the homicide). As far as Lys. 13 is concerned, 
I point out, at first, that the prosecutor, before the court, does not offer any 
evidence that Agoratos has violated the prohibited places: this datum weighs 
46 Carlo pelloso
against the view that trespass is the very nature of the charge. Secondly, Ag-
oratos is never labeled as a κακοῦργος: thus, the theory – proposed by Han-
sen (1976: 101 f.) and followed by Hunter (1994: 135) and by Phillips (2008: 
126 f.) – that the prosecution at issue is an ἀπαγωγὴ κακούργων cannot 
be shared. Thirdly, if trespass is conceived of as a ‘procedural condition’, 
it is natural and easily explainable that the prosecutor, before the judges, 
never accuses the arrested of appearing where he was not allowed, although 
Agoratos could be arrested provided that he frequented public places (cf. 
MacDowell [1963: 120 ff., 130 ff.]; Todd [1993: 276]). Such a matter had 
to be treated during the pretrial stage before the Eleven, since the judges – 
during the trial – were primarily concerned with the substance of the charge, 
that is ‘homicide’. Finally, in order to evade the amnesty terms (Ath. Pol. 
39.5: τὰς δὲ δίκας τοῦ φόνου εἶναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, εἴ τίς τινα αὐτοχειρίᾳ 
ἔκτεινεν ἢ ἔτρωσεν), it was not necessary – as Volonaki (2002: 163 f.), on 
the contrary, claims – to treat trespass as the only formal charge. Indeed, 
the exception to the rule laid down in the sentence ‘τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων 
μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι’ (Ath. Pol. 39.6) may mean that 
the traditional remedies (i.e. the actions undertaken κατὰ τὰ πάτρια) were 
still available against those who were suspected to have brought about an-
other man’s death αὐτοχειρίᾳ during the Thirty, and not that they who 
had killed ‘manifestly and indirectly’ in the same period could not be sued 
through ‘non-traditional’ procedures. Thence, the ἀπαγωγὴ φόνου could 
be undertaken without violating the Amnesty provided that the required 
legal condition (that is ‘violation of prohibited areas’) had occurred in the 
period after 403 B.C.: cf. MacDowell (1963: 121 f.); Evjen (1970: 406); Todd 
(1993: 275 f.); Riess (2008: 69 ff.); Volonaki (2002: 161 f., 167 ff.); Pepe 
(2012: 90, nt. 9). If this interpretation is correct, it is neither necessary to 
believe that this procedure came into operation after the Amnesty treaty 
(403 B.C.) and before Agoratos’ case (399 B.C.), as Volonaki (2002: 164) 
supposes, nor to consider the speech against Aristokrates (352 B.C.) as the 
terminus ante quem and the speech against Agoratos (400-390 B.C.) as the 
terminus post quem, as Hansen (1976: 103) states. On the one hand, one is 
allowed to infer that in 399 B.C. this procedure was not conceived of as a 
‘totally novel remedy’ (since Agoratos does not counter the procedure per se, 
but only the applicability of this extraordinary action to his own case) and, 
at the same time, that it was not a ‘traditional remedy’ (since, otherwise, it 
could not have been undertaken). On the other hand, it is hard to assume 
that this procedure did not exist in 419/418 B.C. (cf. Hansen [1976: 103]), 
when a choregos, in the last but one month in the year, was challenged to a 
δίκη φόνου taken by the kinsmen of a choir-boy who had died after receiv-
ing the wrong medicine by the choregos-substitute (Ant. 6): it is apparent 
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that, in this case, the ‘ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ requirement’ did not occur, even if the 
choregos certainly appeared in public places. To conclude, we can just con-
sider 399 B.C. as the terminus ante quem for the introduction of the so called 
ἀπαγωγή φόνου, while the precise year (some time during the fifth century) 
remains uncertain.
β) As far as Hansen’s view is concerned (Hansen [1981]), four types of 
‘procedures by arrest’ were available against homicides during the fourth 
century B.C.: ἀπαγωγὴ against persons accused of homicide (for which 
the scholar does not suggest any precise date of introduction); ἀπαγωγὴ 
against persons suspected of homicide (introduced between c. 400 and 352 
B.C.); ἀπαγωγὴ against homicides as κακοῦργοι (introduced in the second 
half of the fifth century); ἀπαγωγὴ against exiles who had been sentenced 
for homicide (Drakonian remedy). In his opinion, the second section of the 
document included at Dem. 24.105 (the inauthenticity of which is not even 
taken into account) describes a temporary interruption of the ordinary legal 
action initiated by the magisterial public proclamation. In other words this 
peculiar ἀπαγωγὴ would not have replaced a δίκη φόνου, while the pro-
cedure described at Dem. 23.80 – that is the ἀπαγωγὴ φόνου introduced 
during the first half of the fourth century – would have been a substitute 
for a δίκη φόνου. If this explanation rides out Gagarin’s inconsistencies, it 
presents anyhow several problems (some of which the author himself not-
ed). At first, Dem. 24.105 is our only testimonium for a simple ἀπαγωγὴ 
against ἄτιμοι. Secondly, it is quite impossible that, in the same context, 
the ἀπαγωγὴ against parent abusers and draft-dodgers turns out to be an 
autonomous remedy that ends with a final judgment, while the ἀπαγωγὴ 
against homicides represents an interruption of the main process implying 
just an interim award on a secondary and dependent matter. Thirdly, it is 
very unsound that a person who did not kill ἐκ προνοίας, if arrested before 
the magisterial proclamation, is to be sentenced to death (according to Dem. 
23.80), while, if arrested after the magisterial proclamation, may be just fined 
and, then, sentenced to exile (Dem. 24.105). To conclude, Hansen’s interpre-
tations of the document preserved at Dem. 24.105 must be ruled out (as well 
as Gagarin’s reading); moreover, this testimonium turns out to be radically 
inconsistent with our sources. Ergo, we do not have any valid evidence, com-
ing from the age of the orators, for the precise procedure available against 
‘suspected homicides’ who have been formally banned by the βασιλεὺς from 
the Agora and the holy places (see, amplius, Canevaro [2013a]). Furthermore, 
as regards the supposed ἀπαγωγὴ κακούργων against killers, Hansen’s as-
sumptions cannot be shared. Lys. 13.56 and Lys. 13.85-87 do not demon-
strate that the procedure by arrest taken against Agoratos was an ἀπαγωγὴ 
κακούργων (Hansen [1976: 52, 101 ff.]); they show that the indictment had 
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to be completed with the mention of a ‘homicide committed ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ’, 
and all this may well mean – since Agoratos is never labeled as a κακοῦργος 
– that the ‘ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ requirement’ was a condition for any type of 
ἀπαγωγή, and not for the ἀπαγωγὴ κακούργων only (cf. Volonaki [2002: 
161 f.]; Harris [2006: 291 ff., 373 ff.]; Pelloso [2008: 72 ff.]). Moreover, Ant. 
5 – which Hansen (1976: 105 ff.) considers a good source for reconstructing 
the Athenian law of homicide – seems to shape a phony action (in substance 
and in form), rather than a proper remedy rested upon a solid legal basis 
(MacDowell [1963: 136 f.]; see Gagarin [1979: 318 f.]; contra, cf. Lipsius 
[1905-15: 324 ff.]). On the contrary, the following data suggest that Ant. 
5 is not valid evidence (and, above all, it does not support the thesis that 
ἀπαγωγὴ κακούργων was legally available against homicides). The speech 
at issue is the only example, among the extant sources, attesting the use 
of ἔνδειξις against a ‘felon’-‘homicide’ (although Carawan [1998: 337 ff.] 
rightly suggests that Euxitheos never assumes that the procedure by ἔνδειξις 
and ἀπαγωγὴ was not allowed against killers). Euxitheos maintains that 
the opponent party, in order to prosecute him through such a procedure, 
invented a law ad hoc, behaving like a real legislator (Ant. 5.12, 13, 15: cf. 
Volonaki [2002: 163 ff.]). The case was unprecedented (Ant. 5.9: cf. Gagarin 
[1997: 173, 180 f.]; Hansen [1976: 105 ff.]; Phillips [2008: 123 f.]; contra, see 
Carawan [1998: 334 f.]). The prosecutors – violating the rule of law – did 
stretch the letter of the law by means of an extensive interpretation of the 
word κακοῦργος, notwithstanding that the νόμος κακούργων used such a 
term in a technical and strict sense and did not include in the (likely exhaus-
tive) κακοῦργοι-list those who committed homicide (Ant. 5.9-10: see Han-
sen [1976: 105]; Gagarin [1979: 317 f.]). The unusual and vexatious nature 
of the procedure undertaken for Herodes’ death emerges from the fact that 
the prosecutors previously made some irregular proposal by way of penal-
ty-assessment: which is impossible for an ἀπαγωγὴ κακούργων (cf. Gagarin 
[1989: 26 ff.]), and very implausible for a homicide case. It is not true that 
Aeschin. 1.90-1 attests, for the second half of the fourth century, that the 
ἀπαγωγὴ κακούργων against homicides was warranted by law (cf., for this 
erroneous interpretation, Hansen [1976: 45]; Hansen [1981: 23 f.]; Phillips 
[2008: 124]): provided that in the passage neither the noun ἀπαγωγὴ oc-
curs, nor the technical term κακοῦργος appears, as Harris (2006: 291 ff.) 
has convincingly demonstrated, «Aeschines’ aim in this passage is not to 
discuss a particular legal procedure, but to make a more general point about 
the punishment of all types of serious criminals» (cf. Gagarin [1979: 320, nt. 
60]; Carey [1995]; Fisher [2001: 224 ff.]). Dem. 23 – where we should ex-
pect to find a complete catalogue of all the procedures available against kill-
ers – does not include any mention of the ἀπαγωγὴ κακούργων. According-
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ly, we can infer that the use of the ἀπαγωγὴ κακούργων against homicides 
rests upon no legal basis (once further maintained that the Menestratos’ 
case described at Lys. 13.56 is a precedent for the trial of Agoratos, i.e. an 
example of ἀπαγωγὴ φόνου, and that Lex. Seg. 250.4 carries little weight). 
Contra, several different interpretations concerning the procedure undertaken 
against Euxitheos have been proposed, and all of them imply that the case, 
at least in form, is not groundless: paradigmatically, see Evjen (1970: 404 
ff.) and Heitsch (1984), who believe that ἀπαγωγὴ was not an uncommon 
remedy against foreigners; Carawan (1998: 337 ff.), who rejects the view that 
the procedure against Euxitheos was novel and assumes that it was available 
even against Athenians; Volonaki (2002: 153 ff.), who supposes that the pro-
cedure at issue was established as an alternative homicide procedure in the 
last third of the fifth century by way of a law enacted by the Assembly; Riess 
(2008: 62 ff.), and Phillips (2008), who consider the case against Euxitheos 
the precedent for all ensuing procedures by arrest against homicides.
Appendix 3: some brief considerations on the so-called
‘δῆμος πληθύων provisions’.
According to Ryan, after 594 B.C. neither the Areopagus, nor the Athenian 
magistrates were entitled to inflict the most severe punishments: this scholar, 
in fact, believes that the so called ‘δῆμος πληθύων provisions’ (IG I3 105, l. 
35: ἄνευ το̑ δέμο το̑ Ἀθεναίον πλε]θύοντ̣ος μὲ ἐ̑ναι θαν̣[ά]τοι ζεμι]ο̑[σαι…]; 
IG I3 105, l. 40-1: […ἄνευ το̑ δ]έμο το̑ Ἀθε̣να[ί]ο[ν] πλε-[θύο]ν̣τος μὲ ἐ̣̑ν̣α̣ι 
θοὰν ἐπιβαλε̑ν̣ [Ἀθε]ναίον) were actually passed under Solon (against the 
majority view that, on the contrary, conceived of them as dating back be-
tween the end of the sixth century and the mid of the fifth century): in his 
opinion, «the place to start the argument that a Solonian date … makes the 
most historical sense is with the provisions themselves» (Ryan [1994: 128]). 
Accordingly, already in the early sixth century Athenian citizens could not 
have been sentenced to death or to the highest (monetary) fines without a 
final ‘popular decision’: magistrates and Areopagus were thence expressly 
forbidden by law to give judgments, at least as far as the most serious public 
offences were concerned. This view, although extremely intriguing, is not 
persuasive for several reasons. 1) It implies that the phrase ‘δῆμος πληθύων’, 
is not only suitable to describe the people sitting in both its political capacity 
(as ἐκκλεσία) and in its judicial capacity (as ἡλιαία), but it is the original 
Solonian name of the institutionalized Athenian people (above all in its judi-
cial capacity). Apart from the problematic presence of the word ἐκκλεσία at 
ll. 53 and 54, this interpretation cannot be shared, since it is contradicted by 
a great amount of sources attesting both the antiquity of the denomination 
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‘ἡλιαία’, and the sole judicial meaning of this word from the beginning: see 
Dem. 24.105, 114 and Lys. 10.16 (where Solon is directly connected with 
such an institution); Antiph. 6.21, 23 (where the semantic interchange be-
tween ἡλιαία and δικαστήριον occurs and where it is attested that the name 
and the institution date back to the beginning of the sixth century); Dem. 
24.148; Hyper. 4.40 (where the oath sworn by the popular judges is called 
either ‘heliastic’ or ‘of the heliasts’); Ar. Eq. 798, Vesp. 195, 772, 891, Lys. 
380 (where the noun δικασταί overlap ἡλιασταί); actually the idea that 
the Solonian name for the new tribunal was ἡλιαία is generally agreed: cf. 
Rhodes (1981: 160); Ostwald (1985: 9 f.); but see, also, although from an 
excessively skeptical view, Bleicken (1995: 27): «wie die Behörde hieß, die 
Solon einrichtete, ist uns nicht bekannt». Contra Ryan’s hypothesis, Cloché 
(1920) proposes a date between 508-7 and 480-79; Bonner and Smith (1930: 
340 ff.) believe that 501 is the most probable date; Rhodes (1972: 197 f.), 
underlines that «the Athenians were content to retain obsolete expressions 
in their laws», reckons with «a more conservative drafter» and assumes that 
the provisions at issue «are likely to have been drafted before 450», even 
if he does not believe that «greater precision is possible». Ostwald (1985: 
29 ff.) adduces six trials for which only popular jurisdiction is attested as 
evidence for the prior passage of the so called ‘δῆμος πληθύων provisions’ 
(cf. Hdt. 6.21.2 [the trial of Phrinicus for ‘having reminded the Athenians of 
their misfortunes’: 493-2 B.C.]; Hdt. 6.104.2 [the first trial of Miltiades for 
tyranny: perhaps 493-2 B.C.]; Hdt. 6.136 [the second trial of Miltiades for 
deception of the Athenians: 489 B.C.]; Lyc. 1.117 [the trial of Hypparchus for 
treason: after 480 B.C.]; Thuk. 1.135.2-3 [the trial of Themistokles for trea-
son: about 471-0 B.C.]; Ath. Pol. 27.1; Plut. Cim. 14.3-4, 15.1, Per. 10.6 [the 
trial of Kimon for having accepted bribes: 462 B.C.]), and since the first trial 
took place before 490, he assumes «an early fifth-century version», or «leg-
islation enacted in the late sixth or early fifth century». To me this seems the 
most plausible view: first, all of these cases involve a public interest and the 
πόλις as a whole is the wronged party (tyranny; deception of the Athenians; 
treason; bribes); second, one would expect the Areopagus to have jurisdic-
tion over these cases, while, following Hignett (1952: 154 f.) and Ostwald 
(1985: 31), all these trials, virtually implying ‘death penalty’, or ‘declaration 
of outlawry’, or ‘very high monetary fines’, were definitely allocated to the 
people (for a different interpretation, cf. Hansen [1975: 69 ff.]; Rhodes [1979: 
105]). 2) It also maintains that in the seventh century B.C. the Areopagus 
was simply a homicide court, becoming, only after Solon’s reforms, a very 
criminal court: in other words, after 594 B.C. public cases would have been 
undertaken before the Areopagus, but its judicial powers would have been 
immediately limited by the ‘δῆμος πληθύων provisions’. Apart from the un-
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likelihood that a supposed new Areopagitie power emerges from the outset 
already so restricted, no source does indeed support these statements: on 
the one hand, it is well attested, either directly or indirectly, that since the 
pre-Drakonian age offences against the community were tried before the 
aristocratic Council of the Athenians; on the other hand, it is apparent that 
Solonian ἔφεσις solely concerned ‘magisterial judgments’ (Plut. Sol. 18.2). 
3) Furthermore, the final nature of the Areopagite decisions turns out to 
be a constant principle for the pre-ephialtic legal procedure (cf. MacDowell 
[1978: 39]), so that it seems very implausible to assume that Solon extended 
ἔφεσις to cases heard by the Areopagus (cf. Dem. 23.22; Lys. 7; Ath. Pol. 
8.2, 60.2). But see, skeptically, Ostwald (1985: 12): «from the time of Solon 
we have no indication whatever to affirm or deny that the verdict of the Ar-
eopagus was final in crimes against the state». That Areopagite judgments 
were probably just final is not even contradicted by IG I3 105, l. 35, 40-1. If 
the rules at issue provide that the death sentence (as well as the imposition 
of a θοά) cannot be passed ἄνευ το̑ δέμο το̑ Ἀθεναίον πλε]θύοντ̣ος, it is clear 
that the Areopagus cannot longer give a final judgment concerning those 
crimes against the πόλις for which Solon had established an ‘impeachment’ 
procedure (cf., supra, nt. 68). Yet, at the same time, it is not compulsory to 
believe that the phrase ‘ἄνευ το̑ δέμο το̑ Ἀθεναίον πλε]θύοντ̣ος’ implies a 
first Areopagite judgment susceptible to be appealed. Indeed, the provision 
could mean that a preliminary hearing had to take place before the ancient 
aristocratic court and the case was then referred to the people for a final 
judgment. 4. Finally, it presumes that ἔφεσις was just a ‘mandatory referral’ 
from the beginning: which is not uncontroversial at all (see, supra, ntt. 70, 
80 and 81). 
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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ
C. PELLOSO: Η υποβολή κατηγορίας από τον βουλόμενον στο πρώϊ- 
μο αττικό δίκαιο: οι Δρακόντειες καταβολές της νομοθετι-
κής αναθεώρησης του Σόλωνα
Είναι άραγε πιθανόν να ανιχνευθούν κατάλοιπα της νομοθεσίας του 
Δράκοντος στην σολώνεια αναθεώρηση όσον αφορά στον θεσμό της υπο-
βολής δίωξης από τον βουλόμενον, δηλαδή του δικαιώματος που είχε κάθε 
πολίτης (ὁ βουλόμενος) να προσφύγει στο δικαστήριο προς υπεράσπιση 
οποιουδήποτε αδικουμένου; Υπό το πρίσμα ενός τόσο βασικού ερωτήμα-
τος, η μελέτη αποσκοπεί να καταδείξει ότι ο νόμος του Δράκοντος, έστω κι 
αν δεν ανέπτυξε μία συστηματική και γενική αντίληψη περί της εννοίας του 
εγκλήματος, αντιμετώπισε από διαδικαστική άποψη ορισμένα αδικήματα 
ως εγκληματικές συμπεριφορές στρεφόμενες κατά της πόλεως (όπως για 
παράδειγμα την απόπειρα εγκαθίδρυσης τυραννικού πολιτεύματος ή την 
παράβαση του κανόνος περί εξορίας) και ταυτόχρονα έδωσε στους πολίτες 
τη δικονομική δυνατότητα να φέρουν τις υποθέσεις δημοσίου ενδιαφέρο-
ντος προς εκδίκαση ενώπιον του αρμοδίου δικαστηρίου. Από την άλλη πάλι 
μεριά θα μπορούσε να υποστηριχθεί η εκδοχή ότι και, πριν ακόμα από τον 
Σόλωνα, οι Αθηναίοι άρχοντες, αρμόδιοι για να εκδίδουν οριστικές απο-
φάσεις και να επιβάλουν ποινές με δική τους πρωτοβουλία, ανελάμβαναν 
τη δικονομική προστασία των ανυπεράσπιστων εκείνων θυμάτων που δεν 
είχαν δικαίωμα να υποβάλουν κατηγορία (όπως φερ’ ειπείν μπορεί κανείς 
να συνάγει αναφορικά με τον καταδικασθέντα για ανθρωποκτονία συνε-
πείᾳ εκβιασμού και βασανιστηρίων). 
Κατ’ ακολουθίαν μπορεί κανείς να συνάγει το συμπέρασμα ότι ο Σόλων 
δεν εισήγαγε ex novo τη νομική κατασκευή της «λαϊκής και εθελούσιας κα-
τηγορίας»· πράγματι ο αθηναίος νομοθέτης, επικεντρωμένος περισσότερο 
στην ανάγκη αλληλεγγύης και συνοχής της αθηναϊκής κοινωνίας από την 
ανάγκη προστασίας του κοινωνικού συμφέροντος, μέσω του θεσμού της 
μήνυσης εκ μέρους τρίτου – μη εμπλεκόμενου – μέρους περιόρισε τον ρόλο 
που επιτελούσαν στο παρελθόν οι άρχοντες ενώ ταυτόχρονα αναβάθμισε 
την προϊσχύουσα διαδικασία που αρχικά εξυπηρετούσε μόνον την ασφά-
λεια του κοινωνικού συνόλου.
Λέξεις-κλειδιά: Απόπειρα τυραννίας, διαδικασίες με βάση τη νομοθεσία 
του Δράκοντα, αρμοδιότητες αρχόντων και ανυπεράσπιστα θύματα, εγκλή-
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ματα κατά του κοινωνικού συνόλου, αναθεωρήσεις του Σόλωνα, δικαίωμα 
προσφυγής στο δικαστήριο από τρίτο – μη εμπλεκόμενο – μέρος, ἀπαγωγή 
κατά ανθρωποκτόνων, ὁ βουλόμενος 
